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THE "FAIR REPRESENTATION" DOCTRINE: AN
EFFECTIVE WEAPON AGAINST UNION

RACIAL DISCRIMINATION?
By NEIL M. HERRING*
In the evolution of American labor law, governmental
remedies for racial discrimination by labor unions are relatively recent phenomena. The "fair representation" doctrine, a narrowly defined approach in a field replete with
broader alternatives, is a response to a variety of problems

faced by particular groups.'
I.

THE STEELE CASE AND ITS JUDICIAL AFTERMATH

Logically and chronologically, all discussion of the doctrine of fair representation must start with the case of

Steele v. Louisville & N. R.R.,2 decided in 1944. In 1940,

the Brotherhood of Locomotive Firemen and Enginemen
served on twenty-one southeastern railroads a notice to
change their collective agreements in order to eliminate
every Negro fireman on those lines within two years. As a
result, these railroads indorsed the Southeastern Carriers
Conference Agreement on February 18, 1941, which was
intended to give preference to white firemen in bidding
for vacancies and in making layoffs, in derogation of Negro

firemen's seniority rights. When a Negro, Bester William
Steele, brought an action against the Firemen and the
* Of the Connecticut Bar. A.B. Yale University, 1960; LL.B., Yale Law
School, 1963.
'A political assumption underlies much of what will presently be dealt
with; such assumption being that Negroes are entitled to absolutely equal
opportunity in all areas of American life, and governmental compulsion including a certain degree of "interference" In unions' internal affairs and
bargaining conduct should be utilized to enforce this ideal. To the
extent that this dogma permeates the analysis, this is a partisan essay
which asks, "What can Negroes expect to obtain from the courts and the
National Labor Relations Board in the way of prophylaxis and cure of
labor union discrimination, and at what cost?" The practical consequences
of each episode of litigation since 1944 involving the doctrine of fair
representation have been traced as far as possible, mainly through correspondence with the parties' attorneys. Historical research and personal
interviews were conducted to fill in the gaps.
2323 U.S. 192 (1944).
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carrier, seeking declaratory and injunctive relief under
the Railway Labor Act,3 the Alabama courts dismissed the
bill of complaint.4 On certiorari, the Supreme Court held
that the bill stated a cause of action for breach of the bargaining representative's duty "to exercise fairly the power
conferred upon it in behalf of all those for whom it acts,
without hostile discrimination against them.'' 5
Speaking through Chief Justice Stone, the Court ruled
that both injunctive relief and damages were available to
the Negro firemen for the union's breach of duty to them,
if they could prove the allegations of the complaint. The
Court said:
"So long as a labor union assumes to act as the statutory representative of a craft, it cannot rightly refuse
to perform the duty, which is inseparable from the
power of representation conferred upon it, to represent
the entire membership of the craft. While the statute
does not deny to such a bargaining labor organization
the right to determine eligibility to its membership,
it does require the union, in collective bargaining and
in making contracts with the carrier, to represent nonunion or minority union members of the craft without
hostile discrimination, fairly, impartially, and in good
faith."6
If the statute were interpreted as authorizing the union to
do violence to the interests of some members of the craft
for the benefit of others, the Court indicated it would raise
serious questions under the due process clause of the fifth
amendment.
It was not, however, until 1955 that unions which
operated under the National Labor Relations Act 7 were
held to have the same obligations toward employees that
the Brotherhoods bore under the Railway Labor Act. In
Syres v. Oil Workers,8 the Fifth Circuit affirmed dismissals
of Negro workers' petitions for injunctive relief, construing the Negro local's complaint as merely one for breach
3 Railway Labor Act § 2, Fourth, 48 Stat. 1187 (1934), 45 U.S.C. § 152,
Fourth (1958) :
"Employees shall have the right to organize and bargain collectively
through representatives of their own choosing. The majority of any
craft or class of employees shall have the right to determine who shall
be the representative of the craft or class for the purposes of the Act."
'Steele v. Louisville & N. R.R., 245 Ala. 113, 16 So. 2d 416 (1943).
5323 U.S. 192, 203 (1944).
6Id. at 204.
61 Stat. 136 (1947), as amended, 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-68 (1958), as amended,
29 U.S.C. §§ 153-60 (Supp. IV, 1959-62), amending 49 Stat. 449 (1935).
8223 F. 2d 739 (5th Cir. 1955), rev'4, 350 U.S. 892 (1955).
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of an agreement between it and the white local, involving
no statutory or Constitutional provision upon which to
predicate jurisdiction. On petition to the Supreme Court,
certiorari was granted and the judgment of the Fifth Circuit reversed,9 without oral argument, in a one sentence per
curiam opinion citing Steele and Brotherhood of Railroad
Trainmen v. Howard.10 In 1963, the Supreme Court, in
Humphrey v. Moore," stated explicitly that a union operating under the NLRA has both "the responsibility and duty
comparable to that imposed upon
of fair representation,"
2
the Brotherhoods.
A. Injunctions
1. Discriminationin Collective Bargaining
The principles of law governing judicial relief for discrimination against Negro workers by their bargaining
agents originally were developed in litigation centered in
the southern railroad industry. Indeed, the avenue paved
by the Steele decision has been traveled by hundreds of
plaintiffs since 1944. In order to appraise the effectiveness
of injunction proceedings against discriminatory treatment
during the bargaining process, the history of such conduct
on the part of the Brotherhood of Locomotive Firemen and
Enginemen, the Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen and the
Southern carriers should be examined.
When Steele was hired in 1910, ninety-eight percent of
the firemen within his operating district were Negroes.13
During this period, the railway Brotherhoods wavered between policies of accepting Negroes, and of rejecting them
and seeking their elimination from the railroads.' 4 The
railroads, which had never hired Negroes with the intention
of promoting them from firemen to engineers, took advantage of the Negroes' lack of organization by employing
them to do "white men's work" at lower rates of pay. In
1918, however, wartime transportation chief McAdoo ruled
that Negro railwaymen were to be paid the same amount
as whites for the same work, based upon their actual craft
employment. 15 The carriers soon lost interest in Negroes
as a source of cheap labor, and the all-white Brotherhoods
began to covet the Negroes' jobs. Ironically, the McAdoo
I Syres

v. Oil Workers, 350 U.S. 892 (1955).

10343 U.S. 768 (1952).

"375 U.S. 335 (1964).
"Id. at 342.
"Ross, ALL MANNER OF MEN 136 (1948).
"NORTHRUP, ORGANIzED LABOR AND THE NE)GRO 49 (1944).
';,United States Railroad Administration, General Order No. 27 and Sup-

plements thereto, Nos. 12 and 20 (1918).
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ruling "laid the foundation for a coalition between the
carriers and the unions against Negroes in firemen's and
other high-bracket positions."' 6 Seniority rosters indicate
that by 1925 the railroads had ceased hiring Negro firemen
altogether,'1 7 and virtually all hiring was abandoned during
the post-1930 depression period.
Since 1926 collective bargaining has been carried on
within the framework of the Railway Labor Act. This
statute guaranteed workers the right to choose their bargaining representatives, but it did not require a carrier to
deal only with the representative chosen by the majority of
employees.' After the 1934 amendments, which provided
for exclusive representation, the Firemen and Trainmen
were designated by the National Mediation Board as sole
bargaining agents for their respective classes on ninetynine percent of the total mileage covered by Class I railways. 9 In view of the fact that all of the operating
railway Brotherhoods either excluded Negroes or afforded
them inferior status, it was not surprising that the units
deemed appropriate by the National Mediation Board were
not the ones best suited to advance the welfare of Negro
railwaymen.
Although diesel engines substantially reduced the need
for firemen, in 1937 the Firemen induced the Association
of American Railroads to sign an agreement to place a
"fireman" (i.e., helper) on all diesel locomotives, which
had previously been operated with only an engineer and a
mechanic. ° In order to restrict this featherbed job to
whites, separate agreements were concluded shortly thereafter with most carriers, providing that,
"the employment and assignment of firemen (helpers)
under the terms of the Diesel-electric agreement shall
be confined to those firemen duly qualified for service
on such locomotives; and that only firemen in line of
promotion shall be accepted as duly qualified for such
service."'"
Ross, op. cit. supra note 13, at 120.
The Elimination of Negro Firemen on American Railways - A Study
of the Evidence Adduced at the Hearing Before the President's Committee
on Fair Employment Practices,4 LAW. GUILD. REv. 32, 33 (1944).
Is Texas & N.O. R.R. v. Brotherhood of Ry. Clerks, 281 U.S. 548, 557-58
(1930).
19Class I railways, employing about 90% of all railway workers, are those
having an annual operating revenue of $1,000,000.
17

' SLICHTER, UNION POLICIES AND INDUSTRIAL MANAGEMENT

190 (1941).

1 Brotherhood of Locomotive Firemen and Enginemen, Officers Reports
553-54 (1941). See Mitchell v. Gulf, M. & 0. R.R., 91 F. Supp. 175, 178
(N.D. Ala. 1950).
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The effect of these agreements was to extend seniority
rights on diesel equipment to helpers taken from the ranks
of firemen but to deny Negro firemen the right to operate
as helpers on diesels because both the railroads and the
Brotherhood classified them as non-promotable.
By 1940, the Firemen were ready for a concerted drive
to eliminate Negroes from their positions of already unequal competition. The Brotherhood asked for contracts
with the southeastern carriers stipulating that only promotable men be employed on diesels, and that all vacancies

and new runs22 be staffed by promotable men.23 The carriers refused 4 to agree to the proposals,2 5 and the Firemen
sought the "assistance" of the National Mediation Board,

pressing for what later became known as the Southeastern
Carriers Conference

Agreement.

The SCCA provided,

briefly, that the percentage of non-promotable

6 firemen

on

each carrier was not to exceed fifty percent in each class
of service; after that percentage was reached in a given

seniority district, only promotable (white) men were to be
hired for all new runs and vacancies; and, if any railroad
had more stringent limitations in effect, the Firemen reserved the right to opt for their retention." Thus, a Negro
2Any
technical scheduling changes by management - e.g., change of
starting time over 30 minutes, or the discontinuance and resumption of
seasonal passenger service - constituted, "new runs". See Testimony of
Charles Houston, Hearings on a Federal Fair Employment Practice Act
Before a Special Subcommittee of the House Committee on Education and
Labor, 81st Cong., 1st Sess., 200 (May 17, 1949).
2Id.
at 549-52.
24 Except for the Frankfurt & Cincinnati Railroad Company.
2See
a letter expressing this refusal from the Chairman of the Southeastern Carriers' Conference Committee to the President of (the Brotherhood of Locomotive Firemen and Enginemen, quoted in Tunstall v. Brotherhood of Locomotive Firemen, 69 F. Supp. 826, 828, and 163 F. 2d 289, 291
(4th Cir. 1947).
"To remove any doubt as to which firemen were "non-promotable", the
parties modified their agreement on May 23, 1941:
"1. 'Non-promotable firemen' refers only to colored firemen.
2. Promotable firemen who are physically qualified, or previously
failed an examination, or waived promotion, will be called for
examination from May 1 to May 15. If such firemen fail the
examinations, or waive examination, their seniority as firemen
shall not be affected."

Tunstall v. Brotherhood of Locomotive Firemen, 163 F. 2d 289, 292 (4th
Cir. 1947).
2The
SCCA provided a maximum on employment of Negro firemen, but
no minimum. On the St. Louis-San Francisco Railroad, where the four
Brotherhoods had an agreement that after March 14, 1928, no Negroes
should be hired in train, engine, or yard service, the Firemen elected to
retain the 1928 agreement as having terms more favorable to the white
union than the SCCA, and did not put the latter agreement into effect. On
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fireman could be displaced on the ground that by his presence the fifty percent quota was exceeded. But he had no
way of checking whether this was so, for only the railroad
management and the sole bargaining agent knew what percentage of Negro firemen was currently employed.
In the Steele case, plaintiffs attacked the enforcement
of the SCCA on the Louisville & Nashville Railroad in the
Alabama courts; in Tunstall v. Brotherhood of Locomotive
Firemen," Negro firemen sought to void its application on
the Norfolk Southern Railway in the federal courts. The
cases were consolidated at the Supreme Court level, where
the Court found that such unfair and illegal discrimination was subject to injunction and claims for damages.
Although the Court's opinions left no doubt as to the
illegality of the SCCA, the Firemen's continued enforcement of the agreement and of a large and secret number of
subsidiary agreements left Negro firemen no alternative
other than to invalidate them by instituting a plethora of
lawsuits. The Brotherhood and the southeastern carriers
abandoned these tactics only after Tunstall's $4,000,000
damage claim2 9 and the Supreme Court's decision in
30
Graham v. Brotherhood of Locomotive Firemen,
almost
eight years after the SCCA had been signed. In the Graham
case, much of this subsequent litigation was consolidated
into a claim for damages and injunctions against the
Southern, Seaboard Air Line, and Atlantic Coast Line railroads. The Court forcefully reasserted the principles laid
down in Steele, rejecting the Brotherhood's claim of mislaid venue and exemption under the Norris-LaGuardia
Act. 3 ' Eleven years after signing the SCCA, the defendants
signed a consent decree substantially embodying the terms
of the preliminary injunction. 2
Even while the Graham litigation was proceeding
through the courts, the Brotherhood was concentrating on
the Southern Railway, the Seaboard Air Line Railway, and other properties, the Firemen made supplemental agreements, practically prohibiting
Negro firemen from serving on diesel locomotives. -See Hearings, supra
note 22, at 219.
21323 U.S. 210 (1944), reversing, 140 F. 2d 35 (4th Cir. 1944). Later
developments are reported at 148 F. 2d 403 (4th Cir. 1945) (service of
process found adequate), 69 F. Supp. 826 (E.D. Va. 1946) (plaintiffs'
motion for summary judgment granted), aff'd, 163 F. 2d 289 (4th Cir.
1947), cert. denied, 332 U.S. 841 (1947).
' See Hearings, supra note 22, at 220.
3D338
U.S. 232 (1949).
3147 Stat. 70 (1932), as amended, 29 U.S.C. §§ 101-15 (1958).
Letter to the writer from Henry L. Walker, Vice-President and General
Counsel, Southern Railway System, February 15, 1963; letter to the writer
from Robert R. Faulkner, Special Counsel, Atlantic Coast Line Railroad
Company, February 18, 1963.
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replacing the doomed SCCA with yet another discriminatory stratagem. Six weeks after certiorari was denied in
Tunstall's damages claim,33 the Firemen notified the southern carriers (without similar courtesy to the Negro firemen
affected) of a proposed contractual modification that
"would eliminate the distinction between promotable and
non-promotable firemen." This "forced promotion rule",
which provided that all firemen would thereafter be required to take examinations for promotion to engineer, and
those failing the examinations would be dismissed from
the service, would have cost seventy-five percent of the
remaining Negro firemen their jobs. It should be remembered that the railroads had never hired Negroes with the
intention of promoting them to engineer status, and that
the Negro firemen then in service had from twenty to forty
years' seniority, as the railroads had long ago ceased hiring
such personnel. Nevertheless, the Brotherhood and the
carriers agreed that depriving this minority of seniority
and employment rights was the most expedient - indeed,
the most equitable3 4 - method of affording the railroads
a return on their investment in training firemen-helpers
to be engineers.
Once again the Negro firemen turned to the courts for
relief against the negotiation or application of the new
contractual discrimination. In Hinton v. Seaboard Air
Line R.R.,35 Rolax v. Atlantic CoastLine R.R., 0 and Mitchell
v. Gulf M. & 0. R.R., 7 complaints following the Graham
pattern had been filed in 1947 in an effort to enjoin continued application of the outlawed SCCA and supplementary agreements. These complaints were amended to seek
relief against negotiation of the Brotherhood's forced promotion proposal. Then, two more actions, Brotherhood of
Locomotive Firemen v. Palmer" and Salvant v. Louisville
& N. R.R.,3 9 were instituted with this aim. The interplay
of these five actions bears recapitulation, as their history
casts light on the effectiveness of the "immediate relief"
which they sought.
"332 U.S. 841 (1947).
"See Rolax v. Atlantic Coast Line R.R., 91 F. Supp. 5 (E.D. Va. 1950).
"170 F. 2d 892 (4th Cir. 1948), cert. denied, 336 U.S. 931 (1949). The
complaint was filed in the District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia on February 12, 1947.
8891 F. Supp. 585 (E.D. Va. 1950), rev'd, 186 F. 2d 473 (4th Cir. 1951).
The complaint was filed on February 14, 1947.
1791
F. Supp. 175 (N.D. Ala. 1950), aff'd sub nom. Brotherhood of Locomotive Firemen v. Mitchell, 190 F. 2d 308 (5th Cir. 1951).
as178 F. 2d 722 (D.C. Cir. 1949) (affirming an injunction issued early
in 1948).
0883 F. Supp. 391 (W.D. Ky. 1949).
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The Hinton defendants (Seaboard) were restrained from
enforcing the SCCA by an injunction pendente lite (December 30, 1947) .40 On February 25, 1948, Seaboard moved in
Palmer for a dismissal or, in the alternative, to stay the
Palmer proceedings until Hinton could be decided. On
April 13, Seaboard's motion was denied, 41 whereupon the
railroad petitioned in Hinton for an injunction against the
plaintiff's prosecution of Palmer, which was granted on
April 27. Undeterred by this attempted invasion of its
jurisdiction, on April 29 the Palmer court enjoined Seaboard and the Brotherhood from further negotiating a
forced promotion contract. Ultimately, on November 8,
the Hinton injunction against the prosecution of the Palmer
action was set aside.
Meanwhile, the objections to venue upon which the
original Graham injunction had been temporarily reversed
were accepted by the district court in Salvant, at least until
the Supreme Court could announce a contrary ruling.
On November 21, 1949, the Palmer injunction (against
the forced promotion proposal) was affirmed, the Court of
Appeals having delayed its judgment until it could rely on
the Supreme Court's Graham decision.
The defendants (Atlantic Coast Line) in Rolax then
convinced the district court that the plaintiffs had not done
equity in Palmer in obtaining an injunction against a proposal (forced promotion) which would have "corrected"
the discrimination complained of under the SCCA. The
court denied plaintiff's motion for an injunction and found
it difficult to understand why the Negro firemen-plaintiffs
were resisting the Brotherhood's "good faith" attempt to
give them "both
equality and the responsibilities which
42
accompany it."
Following reversal of Rolax,4 3 injunctions ultimately
were issued in each of the five actions against all previous
and continuing discriminatory bargaining by the Brotherhood and the southeastern carriers.4"
In 1926, then-President D. B. Robertson of the Brotherhood of Locomotive Firemen and Enginemen had stated
45
that he hoped Negro firemen would soon be eliminated.
One can only conclude, from this twenty-year vantage
point, that the Steele line of injunctions interposed no sub10Hinton v. Seaboard Air Line R.R., 170 F. 2d 892, 893 (4th Cir. 1948).
" Ibid.
2 Rolax v. Atlantic Coast Line R.R., 91 F. Supp. 585, 592 (E.D.
Va. 1950).
,Rolax v. Atlantic Coast Line R.R., 186 F. 2d 473 (4th Cir. 1951).
"Letter to the writer from W. R. C. Cocke, attorney for Seaboard Air
Line Railroad, February 12, 1963.
15SPERo and HARRiS, THE: BLACK WORKER 307 (1931).
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stantial barrier to the achievement of the Firemen's purposes. Two cases ended in consent injunctions, one of
which had to be ordered by the Supreme Court;4 6 another
later proved impotent in meeting more subtle breaches of
the duty of fair representation. 47 Steele and Tunstall were
ultimately ordered restored to their respective passenger
runs and positions on seniority rosters. Since their em-

ployers had not hired Negro firemen since the 1920's, the
net effect4" of these decisions was to preserve the employment rights of a then dwindling number of elderly Negroes
until their impending retirement. The Hinton, Palmer and

Rolax injunctions could not, therefore, succeed in placing

Negro firemen in diesel cabs,49 but rather guaranteed the

seniority prerogatives of a few old men until they departed5 ° from a shrinking work force.5
"Graham v. Brotherhood of Locomotive Firemen, 338 U.S. 232 (1949).
Washington v. Central of Georgia Ry., unreported consent injunction
against the forced promotion contract and other discrimination (M.D. Ga.,
Judge A. B. Conger, March 25, 1952), 174 F. Supp. 33 (M.D. Ga. 1958)
(subsequent discrimination insufficiently shown for contempt citation),
aff'd sub nora. Marshall v. Central of Georgia Ry., 268 F. 2d 445 (5th Cir.
1959); but see (unpublished) Report on Negro Firemen submitted by
Joseph Goldstein to Attorney Joseph L. Rauh, April 20, 1954, for striking
documentation of such continuing discrimination.
"After the Steele decision, the Brotherhood of Locomotive Firemen and
Enginemen did not eliminate from its constitution the "white-born" qualification for membership. Instead, it added the following provision:
"[I]f 'these provisions conflict with any federal, state, or Canadian
laws, the provisions of such laws shall supersede these provisions to
the extent required to bring about conformation (sic) . . . and to
remove the violation or conflict."
LEisERsoN. AMERICAN TRADE UNION DEMOCRACY 118-19 (1959). The Brotherhood is today the only affiliate of the AFL-CIO which has preserved such
a color bar in its constitution.
,9 "I do not recall any other techniques in connection with the forced
promotion contracts of Negro firemen, it being my recollection that there
was promotion of Negro firemen to firemen's jobs on steam locomotives.
To what extent such promotions occurred on the diesel locomotives, I do
not know, but it is my present impression that most of the Negro firemen's
jobs were washed out by gradual attrition and the non-employment of new
" Letter to the writer from W. R. C. Cocke,
Negro help on the diesels ..
attorney for Seaboard Air Line Railroad, February 12, 1963.
I "Negro firemen have been retained in service until such time as their
employment relationship is terminated by retirement, death, resignation,
Letter to Percy W. 'Johnston, Jr., General
dismissal for cause, etc .......
Attorney, Gulf, Mobile & Ohio Railroad, from Personnel Assistant C. F.
Burch, February 5, 1963.
"An ironic epilogue to the Firemen litigation may be found in Williams
v. Central of Ga. By., 124 F. Supp. 164 (M.D. Ga. 1954). There the plaintiffs were white firemen who had failed examinations for promotion to
engineer. Under a 1944 forced promotion contract which still applied to
them (as whites), they were consequently confined to yard, duty assignment, while Negroes with less seniority ('but exempted from examinations)
retained their road assignments. The court held that the plaintiffs, having
reaped the benefits of discrimination by standing for promotion to engineer
which was denied to Negroes, could not claim discrimination when such
favoritism had some "inconvenience" attached to it.
47

MARYLAND LAW REVIEW

[VOL. XXIV

The anti-Negro machinations of the Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen, while generally more sophisticated in technique, closely paralleled those of the Firemen. At their
1919 convention, the Trainmen adopted a resolution calling
on all general committees to press for a rule that no more
non-promotable men would be employed, and that the practice of using "train porters" to perform the duties of baggagemen, flagmen or brakemen would be discontinued.5 2
This strategy represented the Trainmen's reaction to the
United States Railroad Administration's moves to set up
certain functional tests for classification as brakemen5 3 and
to equalize black and white wages according to those tests.
In self-defense, the Trainmen undertook a two-pronged
attack on Negro brakemen's jobs: a series of "jurisdictional" claims filed with the National Railroad Adjustment
Board;5 4 and persistent pressuring of the southeastern carriers to renegotiate the Negroes out of work.
On March 14, 1928, without notice at any stage of the
negotiations to Negro trainmen, the Brotherhood signed a
contract with the St. Louis-San Francisco Railway which
prohibited future hiring of Negroes in train, engine or yard
service. This contract was the signal for a campaign, lasting through the 1950's, to deprive Negroes classified as
"train porters" of the head-end braking work on passenger
trains which they had been performing for over forty
years, and to deliver this work to white brakemen who
were BRT members. By 1946, many southern carriers had
decided that if Negroes could not be exploited as brakemen for porters' wages, there was little reason to retain
them in service over the protests and repeated strike
threats of the Trainmen.
Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen, Proceedingsof the Second Triennial
Convention 229-30 (1919).
Supplement No. 12 to General Order No. 27, supra note 15:
"To carry out the intent of Article VI of General Order No. 27 and
retroactive to June 1, 1918, it is ordered:
1. Employees in a passenger train crew, except conductor, collector,
and baggagemaster, qualified and regularly required to perform the
following duties, will be designated as passenger brakemen or flagmen and paid accordingly:
2. Where white brakemen are not employed, the compensation and
overtime rule for colored brakemen shall be the same, for both
passenger and freight service, as for the same positions on the
minimum paid contiguous road.
3. This order shall not curtail the duties of employees heretofore
classed os train porters.
4. This order shall not infringe upon the seniority rights of white
trainmen."
"Hearings, supra note 22, at 208.
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In Randolph v. Missouri-K.-T. R.R. 55 and Howard v.

Thompson 6 the porters filed suit in the federal courts to
protect themselves from loss of their traditional employment rights. These actions had the immediate aims of
preserving the plaintiffs' jobs and preventing the Trainmen
from continuing their illegal bargaining activities. Their
long-range purposes were the reclassification of porters as
brakemen who would receive equal pay and the prospective inducement of the Trainmen to represent Negroes'
interests fairly. The lower courts found it necessary to
deny jurisdiction, referring the plaintiffs to the National
Mediation Board for a determination of their "jurisdic-

tional" (i.e., craft) rights. The Randolph porters secured
an injunction five years later,"7 while Howard's case is still
in court today under the aegis of the N.A.A.C.P.58

In Hunter v. Atchison, T. & S.F. Ry. 59 and Dwellingham

v. Thompson,6" Negro porters and waiters-in-charge sought
to void and enjoin enforcement of NRAB awards,6 decreed
without notice to them and depriving them of employment
in favor of white Trainmen. Two district courts held that
the NRAB had exceeded its authority by modifying collective agreements without affording the interested plaintiffs
an opportunity to be represented at the hearings. In a

similar case, the union involved chose not to seek the
Negroes' displacement in a subsequent fair proceeding.6 2

The history of the case is lengthy. 68 F. Supp. 1007 (W.D. Mo. 1946)
(temporary restraining order), 7 F.R.D. 54 (W.D. Mo. 1947) (temporary
injunction), rev'd, 164 F. 2d 4 (8th Cir. 1947), cert. denied, 334 U.S. 818
(1948) ; 78 F. Supp. 727 (W.D. Mo. 1948) (motions for leave to file supplemental bill of complaint and for restraining order denied), 85 F. Supp. 846
(W.D. Mo. 1949) (jurisdiction taken, after NMB dismissal), aff'd, 182 F.
2d 996 (8th Cir. 1950); 100 F. Supp. 139 (W.D. Mo. 1951) (permanent
injunction), aff'd sub nor. Wood v. Randolph, 209 F. 2d 634 (8th Cir. 1954).
"72 F. Supp. 695 (E.D. Mo. 1947) (injunction denied), rev'd sub nom.
Howard v. St. Louis-S.F. Ry., 191 F. 2d 442 (8th Cir. 1951), aff'd, 343 U.S.
768 (1952).
5 100 F. Supp. 139
(W.D. Mo. 1951), affd s ub nora. Wood v. Randolph,
209 F. 2d 634 (8th Cir. 1954).
1 Interview with Mrs. Maria Marcus, Assistant Counsel, N.A.A.C.P..
January 11, 1963. The case is styled Civil Action No. 62 C 358 (3), United
States District Court for the Eastern District of Missouri, Eastern Division.
An amended complaint was filed on December 12, 1962.
" 21 L.R.R.M. 2279 (1947), 78 F. Supp. 984 (N.D. Ill. 1948), aff'd, 171 F.
2d 594 (7th Cir. 1948), cert. denied sub nom. Shepherd v. Hunter, 337 U.S.
916 (1949). Later developments are reported at 188 F. 2d 294 (7th Cir.
1951) (permanent injunction reversed, but temporary injunction reinstated
until final NRAB determination), cert. denied, 342 U.S. 819 (1951).
6091 F. Supp. 787 (E.D. Mo. 1950), aff'd sub norn. Rolfes v. Dwellingham,
198 F. 2d 591 (8th Cir. 1952).
11National Railroad Adjustment 'Boards, First Division, Awards Nos.
6635-40 (1944).
61Griffin v. Gulf & S.I. R.R., 198 Miss. 458, 21 So. 2d 814 (1945).
"At the time the litigation arose the management of Gulf & Ship
Island Railroad Company, as well as its own legal staff and its outside
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In Hunter, where the courts ordered NRAB to re-open its
docket on the void award, the Board ultimately preserved
the rights of the plaintiff porters to head-end braking work
without explicitly reversing its previous determination. 3
The practical result of the Dwellingham litigation was a
full hearing before the NRAB Third Division, after which
the Board decided that "whether a waiter-in-charge
(Negro) or a steward (white) is to be used to fill the positions involved is a matter for determination by the management in the exercise of its discretion."64 A few years
before, the FEPC could only conclude that the difference
between "stewards" and "waiters-in-charge" on dining cars
was that the former wore black coats, and the latter wore
white and were paid half of stewards' wages. 5 Shortly
after the NRAB decision, however, the two groups signed
agreements with the carrier which provided that waitersin-charge could not be employed on dining cars that had
more than four waiters.6 6 This arrangement, while securing proportional protection from the effects of reduced
counsel, was of 'the opinion that Sam Griffin and the other Negro
firemen were in the right and that the Brotherhood of Locomotive
Engineers and the white firemen were in the wrong. Consequently both
the lawyers representing the railroad company and the lawyers representing Griffin and the other Negro firemen took the same position in
court. After the case was decided by the Mississippi Supreme Court
in favor of Griffin and the other Negro firemen, the railroad company
recognized the seniority rights of Griffin and the other Negro firemen ....
[T]here were no further proceedings before the Adjustment
Board and ... the matter was finally terminated by the supreme court
decision ....
[T]he railroad immediately made up a new seniority list
and started basing work assignments on it when the supreme court
decision was rendered."
Letter to the writer from James -Simrall, Jr., then attorney for the Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers, February 7, 1963.
13National Railroad Adjustment Board, First Division, Award No. 19324,
October 14, 1959.
" National Railroad Adjustment Board, Third Division, Award No. 6031,
January 12, 1953.
6 Hill, Labor Unions and the Negro: The Record of Discrimination,28
COMMENTARY 479, 484 (1959).
6Memorandum of Agreements between the Missouri Pacific Railroad
Company and the Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen and Local No. 354,
Hotel and Restaurant Employees International Alliance, March 25, 1953.
Also, "Following the decision of the Court of Appeals, the parties entered
into an agreement which provided that dining car stewards would be
employed on dining cars having a certain number or more of waiters.
Where less than that number were employed, the waiters in charge would
work. I understand that as a result of reduction in dining car service and
the substitution of grill cars for dining cars in many cases, the employment of dining car stewards was severely curtailed. I ... do not know the
status of waiters in charge at this time, although I would assume under
the circumstances that they were not affected as much by the curtailment
of service as were the dining car stewards." Letter to the writer from
Charles R. Judge, attorney for the Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen,
February 22, 1963.
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dining car service, amounts to nothing more than a racially
determined allocation of job opportunities.
Clearly, the employment rights of a racial minority may
be jeopardized in a number of ways after the bargaining
union and employer have ceased negotiation. Unions bent
on eliminating Negro workers' jobs have not hesitated to
exploit the most respected techniques, including arbitration awards and jurisdictional claims before administrative
agencies, for maintaining industrial peace in the attempt.
Historically, the courts have found it easier to regard the
deprivation of Negroes' jobs resulting from these tactics
as a violation of federal Constitutional due process, than to
view direct pressure on management as a violation of the
Brotherhood's federal "statutory" duty of fair representation. Even when Negro workers could participate in fair
hearings before the NRAB, the remedies available in that
forum could hardly prove adequate. The adjustment boards
are composed of equal numbers of representatives of carriers and railway labor unions. To refer the racial minority
to its joint oppressors for "justice", therefore, smacks of
cynical fraud. Moreover, the adjustment boards apparently refuse to hear complaints filed by individual members of a craft represented by a labor organization. Where
the real grievance is systematic exclusion from preferred
jobs, a series of individual complaints is cumbersome and
expensive. Finally, while the relief obtainable from the
NRAB is not limited to an award of damages, its decision
cannot go beyond the existing contract; even if it were
favorable to the plaintiffs, they would find it necessary to
seek relief whenever the carrier and union modified their
agreement.
The Firemen and Trainmen litigation represents attempts to prevent breaches of those unions' duty of fair
representation in bargaining where the breaches have been
drastic enough to have directly threatened Negro plaintiffs' jobs. On this crucial level, the courts have belatedly
and inadequately coped with such threats, reluctantly accepting jurisdiction and permitting defendants' attorneys
to becloud the real issues with dilatory procedural moves.
One principle made indelibly clear by the Steele case
was that bargaining agents had no right, at the very least,
to pressure employers for the elimination of a part of their
constituency.6 7 By the time the courts saw fit to intervene
61The theories utilized by the plaintiffs during the entire course of the
Randolph litigation (for the history of this case see supra note 55) demonstrate that this course of conduct by a bargaining representative could be
enjoined under revered tort and equity propositions, without any reliance
on the Steele doctrine.
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on behalf of Negroes who were threatened with job losses
because of a discriminatory agreement," the defendants
had initiated another equally menacing bargaining offensive.69 On the otherhand, where Negroes could get wind
of the contemplated betrayal - as they did when the Firemen proposed a forced promotion system - the relief
provided by injunction against the negotiation of an obviously discriminatory
arrangement proved adequate to the
7
immediate danger. 1
By way of contrast, three California cases decided prior
to the Taft-Hartley Act 71 had established the rule that

where a union maintained a closed shop, it could not demand the firing of Negroes discriminatorily barred from
full membership rights. In James v. Marinship Corp.,72
Williams v. International Bhd. of Boilermakers, 73 and
Thompson v. Moore Drydock Co.,74 the Boilermakers Local

No. 6 had insisted, under their closed shop Master Agreement with the Pacific coast shipyards, that Negro workers
join Auxiliary A-41 in order to get work clearances. The
California courts protected the Negroes' jobs, explicitly
offering the union the alternatives of admitting Negroes on
an equal basis or refraining from enforcing the closed shop
agreement against them. Faced with this choice, the Boiler-

"

E.g., the Southeastern Carriers Conference Agreement of February
18, 1941.
1 See text at notes 33-44 supra.
See, e.g., Rolax v. Atlantic Coast Line R.R.. 186 F. 2d 473 (4th Cir.
1951) ; Hinton v. Seaboard Air Line R.R., 170 F. 2d 892 (4th Cir. 1948) ;
and Salvant v. Louisville & N. R.R., 83 F. Supp. 391 (W.D. Ky. 1949). The
difference in potential judicial effectiveness in the two situations is pointed
up by developments subsequent to Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen v.
Howard, 343 U.S. 768 (1952) : "Some two or three years later the train
porters on the Missouri Pacific Railroad were squeezed by the Pullman
Porters Union, composed essentially of Negro workers, and forced to join
that union despite the fact that the train porters contended that they did
not want to agree that they were porters rather than operating trainmen. . . . The train porters of the Missouri Pacific Railroad belonged to
a union of their own choice when they were rejected as members by the
Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen. The net result of the Cook case (Cook
v. Brotherhood of Sleeping Car Porters, ... Mo ...
, 309 S.W. 2d 579
(1958), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 817 (1958)) was that the men lost their jobs
after the injunction was lifted. The Cook case pointed up that when the
white union left the men unrepresented, the Negro Brotherhood of Sleeping
Car 'Porters obfuscated the proper classification of the men and in effect
endorsed the rejection by the Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen of the
rights of the men to full and fair representation and proper classification.
The railroad became the beneficiary also of the miscarriage, insofar as it
paid brakemen classified as train porters, who did more than ordinary
white brakemen, less money than a white brakeman." Letter to the writer
from Victor Packman, attorney for the Negro "porters", January 9, 1963.
7161 Stat. 136 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 158a(3) (1958).
72 25 Cal. 2d 721, 155 P. 2d 329 (1944).
1327 Cal. 2d 586, 165 P. 2d 903 (1946).
14 27 Cal. 2d 595. 165 P. 2d 901 (1946).
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makers admitted Negro members, and today Negroes hold
a substantial number of jobs in the West Coast shipyards.7 5
The duty of fair representation was extended by the
Supreme Court in Conley v. Gibson76 to situations in which
the union failed to protest management action that resulted in Negroes' loss of jobs. The Texas & New Orleans

Railroad had summarily abolished forty-five jobs held by
Negro employees, in violation of a contract with the
Brotherhood of Railway Clerks," whose (white) Local 2878

accepted the railroad's excuses and refused to process the
displaced Negroes' grievances. These jobs were soon filled
by some Negro employees, who undertook the same work
without the seniority that they had accrued in service with
the railroad. On remand from the Supreme Court, over

seven years after the union's failure-to-protest breach of
its Steele duty, the district court granted the defendants'

motion to dismiss the complaint as to the deceased plaintiffs, and also granted defendants' motion for summary

judgment as to the remaining plaintiffs' original class
action.7 9 Most of the issues had by then become moot, since
the "threatened wholesale discharges (had) halted shortly
after suit was filed, so that all named plaintiffs had nothing
to actually litigate." 0
The plaintiff carmen-helpers in Britton v. Atlantic Coast
Line R.R.,1l have been less successful in their fight to retain

jobs "abolished" by management and assigned to white
carmen and mechanics. While closely analogous to Conley,
the situation of these Negro workers is more precarious,

for the Brotherhood of Railway Carmen, the white local,
has apparently "processed" their grievance through administrative arbitration.

2

Thus, in these two cases where

"5"After the decision in the James case, the Boilermakers Union admitted
Negroes in California, and I understand they still do. . . . I do not know
their policy in the rest of the country .... Today the Bay Area shipyards
are at a low ebb so far as employment is concerned, but I understand
that Negroes are employed by ithem. I believe that there are only two
shipyards in the area, one at Mare Island which is a naval shipyard and I
know that Negroes work there, and the other is the Bethlehem shipyard
here, and my general knowledge tells me that Negroes are emplbyed there."
Letter to the writer from George R. Andersen, attorney for the Negro
workers, February 14, 1963.
"355 U.S. 41 (1957).
7I.e.,
the Brotherhood of Railway and Steamship Clerks, Freight Handlers,
Express and Station Employees.
8
" The plaintiffs were members of segregated Local 6051.
9138
F. Supp. 60, aff'd, 229 F. 2d 436, rev'd, 355 U.S. 41 (1961).
0 Letter to the writer from Roberson L. King, attorney for the Negro
plaintiffs, February 27, 1963.
81303 F. 2d 274, 50 L.R.R.M. 2232, 7 RAcE REL.L. REP. 498 (5th Cir. 1962),
aff'd sub nom. King v. Atlantic Coast R.R., 323 F. 2d 1005 (5th Cir. 1963).
The Carmen's (white) local and the railroad were unable to settle the
grievance, which was subsequently submitted to the Second Division of the
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the plaintiffs have alleged discrimination because of the
white locals' failure to protest their discharge adequately,
the courts have not been able to protect Negro workers'

jobs. This incapacity is traceable to the courts' acceptance

of the unions' arguments that the management's decision

was "justified" and that the union had done everything
within its power to prevent its implementation."' The

courts have been reluctant to inquire whether a union
which maintains segregated locals and whose white members replace the discharged Negroes can be said to have
earnestly prosecuted the latters' complaints.
NRA!B on November 30, 1960 (Docket No. 3860). A hearing on the dispute
was held on March 2, 1961, but the Division was unable to agree upon its
disposition for a year. During that time, the plaintiffs filed their complaint
in the district court, seeking an injunction and damages for the lost work.
The court dismissed the complaint for its failure to assert a basis for
federal jurisdiction, without leave to amend. The Fifth Circuit Court of
Appeals affirmed the dismissal, but remanded the cause with instructions
to allow the plaintiffs to amend their complaint. On 'June 7, 1962, the
NRAB Second Division held a hearing, with a referee present, but the
latter had not reached a decision by September 25. On the basis of these
facts, the district court granted the defendants' motion for summary
judgment on December 4, 1962. King v. Atlantic Coast Line R.R., Summary
Final Judgment, No. 4576-Civ.-J, United States District Clourt for the
Middle District of Florida.
I "There has been no change in the bargaining agreement since the
Supreme Court decision, nor has there been any change in the relationship
of the parties. The lawsuit was predicated on the premise that the defendant locals had discriminated against the plaintiffs in failing to take the
necessary steps to protect their jobs. This was completely false. There
was nothing left undone by the locals that they could have done to prevent
the 'Southern 'Pacific Transport Company from cancelling its farm-out
contract with the Railway Company and assigning its own employees to
the work in question. Most, if not all, of the affected employees went to
work for the Transport Company, who had a different union (the Teamsters) representing its employees. Obviously, the Brotherhood unions would
have prevented their work being transferred to the jurisdiction of the
Teamsters Union if it had been within their power to do so. There was
the further vague contention, made by the plaintiffs, that there was unlawful discrimination in the maintenance of the two locals, one composed
of whites and the other of Negroes. Not only have the courts held that this
is not unlawful discrimination, but not one of the Negroes ever asked for
membership in the white local." Letter to the writer from Chester M.
Fulton, attorney for the Brotherhood of Railway Clerks in Conley, January 25, 1963.
Also, "The strange thing about this case is that no discrimination
has ever really been present. The union has always supported the claims
of the plaintiffs and continues to do so. The plaintiffs' real complaint
is against the railroad. . . . [Y] ou will notice that there are no specific
charges that the union has taken any affirmative action against the employees involved. The charge seems to be that the union has acquiesced
in the action taken by the railroad. If the union had in fact acquiesced,
and if this were done in bad faith for the purpose of discriminating
against the plaintiffs to the advantage of other members of the union, I
assume that this would violate the union's duty to represent all employees
in the bargaining unit equally and fairly. Even this is not clearly alleged,
however, in the complaint. As we understand the facts, the union has
prosecuted a grievance on behalf of the plaintiffs at every stage of the
grievance procedure." Letter to the writer from William H. Adams III,
attorney for the Carmen in Britton, February 12, 1963.
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2. Perpetuation of Pre-existing Discrimination

In cases involving judicial correction of previously
established discriminatory employment practices, the Negro
complainants have sought amelioration of their position as
compared to that of the white workers, rather than protection from some newly devised threat posed by their bargaining agent. For convenience, railroad industry cases
will be discussed separately; then, judicial intervention in
plans for wholesale renovation of Negro workers' status.

In Dillard v. Chesapeake & 0. Ry., s4 Negro machinistshelpers and laborers brought an action against System Fed-

eration No. 41 s5 and their employer in an effort to put an
end to long-standing racially-oriented denials of promotion
into higher-skill, higher-pay jobs. After the Fourth Circuit
Court of Appeals found that the district court had jurisdiction, 6 and the defendants' motion for summary judgment
was denied, 7 negotiations were initiated by the parties in

an effort to obviate the necessity for a jury trial. In the

compromise ultimately approved by the court, the defendants jointly agreed to amend the collective agreements so
as to guarantee promotion solely on the bases of seniority
and technical qualifications, and the union agreed not to use
its position as statutory bargaining agent to impede the ad-

vancement of Negro employees. 8 No re-arrangement of job
classifications was subsequently undertaken, however, and
the plaintiffs were all well beyond the age limit for advancement to positions which the railroad had been steadily

reducing in number.8 9

199 F. 2d 948 (4th Cir. 1952).
I.e., a bargaining amalgamiation of locals of the IAM, Boilermakers,
Blacksmiths, Sheet Metal Workers, IBEW, Brotherhood of Railway Carmen, and the International Brotherhood of Firemen and Oilers, Roundhouse
and Railway Shop Laborers - only the last of which admits Negroes to
full and equal membership.
11199 F. 2d 948 (4th Cir. 1952).
136 F. Supp. 689 (S.D. W.Va. 1955).
"[JI]t was further agreed that the applicable collective bargaining
agreements should be amended so as to spell out with particularity understandings in substance as follows:
Helpers in the Maintenance of Equipment Department to be advanced
to mechanics tentative and laborers, coach cleaners, helpers, or apprentices on the basis of seniority, ability, and compliance with qualification requirements and without discrimination because of race, color,
or creed.
Also, in applying Rule 40(c) of the Shop Crafts Agreement, selection to be
made from those desiring to become helper apprentices in accordance with
the existing agreement, without discrimination because of race, color, or
creed." Letter to the writer from Strother Hynes, General Solicitor, Chesapeake & Ohio Railroad Company, January 31, 1963.
"Letter to the writer from Amos A. Bolen, attorney for the Chesapeake
& Ohio Railway Company, February 12, 1963.
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Contractual provisions in operation for thirty years,
having a similar freezing effect upon Negro employees,
were challenged in Jones v. Central of Georgia RyY0 The
court enjoined the railroad and the Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen from continuing practices which denied
Negroes the opportunity to compete and train for jobs as
flagmen, baggagemen, and conductors. It further "affirmatively required each to grant the same seniority rights,
training privileges, assignments and opportunities to these
jobs as white persons of similar continuous service would
enjoy."'" The railroad has declined to answer repeated inquiries as to the implementation of this decree. Most of
the problems it purports to solve, moreover, are taken up
again in the complaint in the current Howard litigation.
In Clark v. Norfolk & W. Ry.f a contractual provision
excluding Negroes from assignment as car retarder operators had been removed for some time, but no Negro yardmen were being permitted to qualify for such positions.
The court enjoined railroad and union from "denying to
the plaintiffs the right and opportunity to qualify and be
assigned on the same terms as whites."" By the time damages were assessed, however, one of the plaintiffs had retired, a second had failed the promotion examination as a
result of obviously parsimonious training, and the third
had never attempted the examination. 4
Finally, Richardson v. Texas & N.O. R.R.9 5 indicates
that the courts can be utilized to redress a single racial
grievance as readily as a pattern of discriminatory treatment. There, Negro yardmen complained of an employer
practice, acquiesced in by the Trainmen, of assigning junior
whites as engine foremen on Negro crews. The Fifth Circuit
found Steele jurisdiction over "the perpetuation of preexisting discriminatory employment practices." 96 On remand, the offending contractual provision was voluntarily
excised,97 and a consent injunction was issued, restraining
the defendants from interfering with the plaintiffs' exer10229 F. 2d 648 (5th Cir. 1956), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 848 (1956).
91Id. at 650 n. 3.
9237

L.R.R.M. 2685, 3 Race Rel. L. Rep. 993 (W.D. Va. 1956).

11Id. at 2687.
14

3 Race Rel. L. Rep. 988, 990.

'2242 F. 2d 230 (5th Cir. 1957), reversing 140 F. Supp. 215 (S.D. Tex. 1956).
Id. at 234.
Letter to the writer from George L. Schmidt, attorney for the Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen, February 5, 1963.
'
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cise of seniority rights as foremen 5 The railroad reportedly is complying with the terms of the decree. 9
Separate seniority lines based on racial alignments,
explicit in collective agreements or tacitly perpetuated,
represent a major barrier to Negro workers' advancement,
particularly in southern manufacturing industries.'

°

In

papermaking, chemical and oil refining, steel and tobacco
manufacturing

-

to name but a few

-

Negroes are usually

hired exclusively as "laborer", "non-operating" or "maintenance" personnel. As a result of these discriminatory
arrangements, qualified Negro workers are barred from
both initial employment and promotion into production and
skilled craft occupations. Negro seniority rights are operative only within certain all-Negro departments, and the
Negro worker is frequently the victim of "inaccurate" job
classifications and wage differentials. Such dual seniority
systems have been the subjects of attack in several cases,
and their modification continues to pose problems relevant
to the present study.
The first - and, possibly, the most important - of these
cases was Syres v. Oil Workers,1 1 a suit to eliminate un-

written separate seniority lines negotiated by a predominantly white bargaining committee at the Port Arthur
refinery of the Gulf Oil Corporation. The factual background, since it is fairly typical, bears some elaboration: 0 2
Negroes were hired into the "labor department" on their

ability to read No SMOKING signs; whites were hired into
the "operating mechanical department", placed on proba'8 (Unreported)
Judgment, Richardson v. Texas & N.O. R.R., Civil Action
No. 9240, United States District Oourt for the Southern District of Texas,
November 8, 1960.
91"Prior to the dismissal, the railroad had begun and still is assigning
foremen on the engines with Colored crews on the basis of seniority, regardless of color, with white men working as helpers if they do not have sufficient seniority to act as foremen." Letter to the writer from George L.
Schmidt, attorney for the Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen, February
5, 1963.
100Elaboration of 'the situation summarized in this paragraph may be
found in articles by Herbert Hill, Labor Secretary of the N.A.A.C.P., including the following: Labor Unions and the Negro, 28 COMEi'TARY 479
(1959) ; Patterns of Employment Discrimination,The Crisis, March, 1962;
Has Organized Labor Failed the Negro Worker?, Negro Digest, May, 1962;
See also the following articles by Professor Ray Marshall: Ethnic and
Economic Minorities: Unions' Future or Unrecruitable?, 350 Annals of
the American Academy of Political and Social Science 63 (1963) ; Some
FactorsInfluencing Union Racial Practices,Proceedings of the 14th Annual
Meeting of Industrial Relations Research Association 104 (1961); Racial
Factors Influencing Entry Into the Skilled Trades, The Economics of
Human Resources 23 (1963).
"0'350 U.S. 892 (1955).
02Id. The facts in this paragraph are drawn from the Union Respondents' Brief in Opposition to Petition for Certiorari 19-31.
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tion for six months, and required to pass certain intelligence tests. In 1954, Negro members of segregated Local
254 demanded integration, and shortly thereafter Gulf made
seventy-six jobs in the operating department available to
labor department employees, waiving educational and other
normal requirements. Union and company stipulated that
they would continue to meet until a mutually acceptable
plan for open bidding could be formulated. Ultimately, a
"compromise" was arrived at, giving Negroes the right to
bid into operating department jobs, provided they had the
high school education and passed the tests uniformly required of white employees. Local 254's demand for a single
starting job was granted.
Meanwhile, Syres and Local 254 had filed a suit against
the white local, seeking injunctive relief and damages. The
international union intervened as amicus curiae on the side
of the plaintiffs.1 "3 By the time the jurisdiction of the court
had been established,'
the new arrangement had been
instituted, and the district court dismissed all but the
plaintiffs' $150,000 damages claim as moot. 105 Actually, of
approximately 700 Negroes employed by Gulf, 150 have
crossed the line into the operating mechanical department.
The balance of the Negroes "will probably not be able to
promote into the skilled jobs because they do not have high
school education or anywhere near its equivalent," even
though the contract provided that a Negro failing the aptitude test could
continue to take it every six months until
1 6
he passed.
The Syres "solution" is important for several reasons:
"the wall has definitely been breached in the oil industry in the Gulf Coast area. . . . All refineries have
nominally opened the doors to the Negroes and some
refineries have developed a substantial degree of integration.... The big refineries of Gulf at Port Arthur,
Mobil Oil at Beaumont, and Sinclair at Houston have
integrated in fact.... In all three refineries, 150 or more
Negroes have moved into the formerly restricted jobs.
Refineries at Shell in Houston, Humble at Baytown,
Texas, AMOCO at Texas City, and others have nominal
clearance for Negroes but these refineries pretend that
they can find no Negroes who can qualify equally with
whites when job applications are open. The same is
S223 F. 2d 739 (5th Cir. 1955).
104350 U.S. 892, reversing 223 F. 2d 739 (5th Cir. 1955).

0See 257 F. 2d 479, 481 (...... ).
" Letter ito the writer from Chris Dixie, attorney for Local 23, January

18, 1963.
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true of the big Texaco refinery, across the street from
the Gulf refinery."'' 7
Under the new contract, Negroes at the Port Arthur refinery moved from top positions in the labor department
into zero seniority standing in the newly integrated system.
Since, in the oil industry, few "Negro jobs" pay higher
wages than the lowest rungs on the white employment
ladder, the plaintiffs who ultimately advanced did not suffer

substantial cuts in wages. 08
Facing the manpower shortage in World War II, Gulf
had hired many employees who could never qualify under
post-War aptitude tests. In fact, previously the company
had hired employees through individual screening, without
the use of either educational criteria or industrial intelli-

gence tests. The integration plan in Syres, however, required Negroes who sought promotion to meet qualification
standards that had been imposed on white applicants since

the War; it did not go so far as to give them the benefit of
the lowest standards which had ever applied in the past."°9
Of course, future employment requirements would have
to be raised uniformly, but such a move could only decrease
Negroes' chances for advancement.
This integration plan has served as a model in two other
cases involving the same union,"' and in Whitfield v.
"The situation in the Gulf Coast area of Texas, which is becoming
quite industrialized, is quite different from the Old South. Integration in
very substantial degree has taken place in a number of industries, notably
the Steel industry, both in the basic steel plant of Sheffield Steel (Armco)
at Houston, and a number of large steel fabridators." Ibid.
"08 Letter to the writer from Chris Dixie, attorney for Local 23, February 19, 1963.
"I "The new plan in the Syres case required no differences in the future,
and no differences in the requirements for incumbent Negroes from the
requirements consistently required by the Company since World War II.
In other words, incumbent Negroes are entitled to promote by passing the
same tests heretofore required in modern times." Ibid.
la°In Holt v. Oil Workers, 36 L.R.R.M. 2702 (Tex. D.C. 1955), the facts
closely paralleled those in Syres. Not long after the plaintiffs filed their
complaint, the defendants Local 367 and the Shell Oil refinery negotiated
an emergency stop, making four "white jobs" preferentially available to
members of their class. The Negro workers then reiterated their dissatisfaction in a complaint to the President's Committee on Government Contracts. Under this concerted pressure, company and union acted quickly
to accomplish what they had long neglected to do for Negro equality,
amending their collective agreement with a "Memlorandum of Understanding" that was subsequently adopted as the basis for a voluntary dismissal.
This agreement, as its Syres counterpart, provided that vacancies in the
newly integrated Service Department would be filled by plant-wide seniority
bids, irrespective of white workers' previous standing in the abandoned
General Helper Department. Here, too, the Negroes "ratified" the new
arrangement, even though it required them to meet the company's qualifications for promotion. See also Jones v. Distillery Workers, 5 Race Rel.
L. Rep. 786 (W.D. Ky. 1960). There, Negro plaintiffs sued the union for
307
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United Steelworkers,"' a case which illuminates whatever
flaws are not apparent in judicial supervision of such
matters, it has survived legal challenge, under different
social and industrial circumstances.
Of 3,000 employees at the Sheffield Steel plant in Houston, approximately 1,300 were Negroes, all of whom belonged to the integrated Steelworkers Local 2708. That
union bargained with the company through a Joint
Seniority Committee composed of two Negroes and two
whites. In 1956, over the opposition of its Negro delegates,
the committee signed an agreement for the gradual elimination of the plant's dual seniority system. Thenceforward, (1) No. 1 line jobs would be open to all bidders,
subject to the company's screening, (2) the 260-hour probation period for No. 1 jobs would be abolished and replaced by industrial tests, (3) Negroes who passed the test
would be given preference for No. 1 vacancies, and (4) if
no Negroes (from the No. 2 line) could bid on No. 1 jobs,
such jobs would be open to bidders from an integrated labor
pool who had passed the tests.
In the steel industry, however, the "wage inequity"
program had developed in a manner in which manual
(i.e., No. 2) laborers in many cases earned more than
$250,000 damages and an injunction against an agreement which restricted
them to Sanitation Department jobs and provided for separate seniority
lists. The parties signed a compromise agreement, approved by the court,
providing for merger of the dual seniority lists and open bidding for General Helper vacancies. As to subsequent developments, "the dual seniority
list has been completely abandoned. There have been some Negroes moved
into jobs other than within the Sanitation Department. There would have
been more but for the fact that some of the Negroes reached on the
seniority list declined to accept the advancement; hence, the next white
person in line received the position." Letter to the writer from James A.
Crumlin, attorney for plaintiff Negroes, March 2, 1963. Moreover, in
Butler v. Celotex Corp., 3 Race Rel. L. Rep. 503 (E.D. La. 1958), the union
was integrated (Local 4-179), and the collective agreement explicitly provided for a unitary promotion and seniority system. Nevertheless, in the
interest of "minimum distress to present employees", the parties agreed' to
an arrangement that would provide for integration of the dual seniority
system even more gradually than those adopted in Syres and Holt: (1)
employees remaining in their present jobs retained their "unwritten"
seniority rights; (2) upon promotion, demotion, transfer, etc., employees
would thereafter fall under the integrated seniority system; and (3)
"When the last employee possessing unwritten seniority" would make a
permanent change of job, all dual seniority would terminate. In its final
decree, the district court retained jurisdiction to allot costs and' supervise
enforcement, in case of violation of the consent injunction provisions.
Since then, "the dual seniority lists have been abandoned and it appears
that there have been no particular problems for any of the employees concerned." Letter to the writer from M. C. Strittmatter, Vice President for
Industrial Relations, The Celotex Corporation, March 23, 1964. Finally,
"[a]s a result of our efforts, a substantial number of Negroes have been
properly upgraded." Letter to the writer from Revius 0. Ortique, attorney
for plaintiff Negroes, March 12, 1964.
263 F. 2d 546 (5th Cir. 1959), cert. denied, 360 U.S. 902 (1959).
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skilled (i.e., No. 1) laborers, because of the exertion,
risk and discomfort of their tasks. Negroes at the top of the
No. 2 line, then, would have to accept substantial wage cuts
as the price of promoting into No. 1 bottom jobs. Furthermore, whites on No. 1 jobs, many of whom had been hired
during wartime labor shortages, were exempted from taking the company's tests in order to remain in their departments. 1 2 The integration plan was submitted to the union
membership at a "ratification" meeting which resulted in
a vote of 1,412 to 202 in favor of the proposal. Of the 900
Negroes who attended, 200 voted against the plan, 14 approved it, and the rest withheld their ballots in protest.
Subsequently, most of the Negro workers refused to take
the promotion tests, apparently relying upon legal action
to invalidate the newly adopted system. Ninety Negroes
did pass, of whom forty-five moved into the lowest No. 1
line jobs, and the remainder were relegated to a reservoir
for filling later vacancies.
In the district court, the plaintiffs were denied relief
on the theory that the integration plan had its foundation
in "essentially relevant" factors, as defined in Steele and
Ford Motor Company v. Huffman."' The Fifth Circuit
agreed:
"We attach particular importance to the good faith
of the parties in working toward a fair solution. It
seems to us that the Union and the Company, with
candor and honesty, acknowledged that in the past
negroes were treated unfairly in not having an opportunity to qualify for skilled jobs. They balanced the
interests of negroes starting Line 1 jobs against the interests of employees, who have worked previously in
Line 1 jobs, in the light of fairness and efficient operation ....

Courts, when called upon to eye such agree-

ments, should not be quick to 'substitute their judgment for that of the bargainingagency on the reasonableness of the modifications.' Pellicer v. Brotherhood
of Railway and Steamship Clerks, 217 F. 2d 205, 206
(5th Cir. 1954) ....
"We cannot turn back the clock. Unfair treatment
to their detriment in the past gives the plaintiffs no
claim now to be paid back by unfair treatment in their
","In order to transfer or promote into any other department, whites
are required to pass the examination. Quite a few of the whites have failed
the examina'tion and are thus confined to their own department." Letter
to the writer from Chris Dixie, attorney for Local 2708, February 19, 1963.
11345 U.S. 330 (1953).
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favor. We have to decide this case on the contract before us and its fairness to all.
"Consideringthe contract from the standpointof all
the employees and recognizing the necessity for reasonable standards of operating efficiency, we find that
there is no evidence of unfairness or discrimination on
the ground of race.... "114
It is easy enough to applaud the courts for approving
integration plans to which Negro workers offered only mild
objections. But is equal enthusiasm merited when a court
rejects the actual sentiments of forty-three percent of the
workers in a plant? It is true that in non-racial cases,
judicial intervention has been restrained by a heavy presumption of regularity accorded the actions of a statutory
bargaining representative.11 It is at best loose thinking,
however, to carry this approach back into racial cases where
Negro plaintiffs have invoked the Steele doctrine in order
to put an end to "compromise" with the discriminatory
environment. In race relations, Negroes are either afforded
"equal" treatment or they are not; the pretense of "almost
equal" treatment is cant. Considering the total unreasonableness of previous denials of promotion on the basis of
race, it is questionable whether "reasonable standards of
operating efficiency" may now be adduced by union and
company in defense of their agreement. Finally, even if
there is a retention of the guide of good faith motivation
on the part of the bargaining agent," 6 or conversely, the
absence of "hostile discrimination"," 7 it is difficult to agree
with the Whitfield courts that a union which concluded an
agreement opposed by almost one-half of its constituency
should have access to this justification.
Anticipating the reader's challenge to produce an alternative rational, let me suggest that the courts either force
the incumbent (No. 1 line) whites to take the new qualification tests (which Negroes must pass in order to be promoted), and demote them if they fail, or allow the Negro
workers to promote into Line 1 under the same standards
-263 F. 2d 546, 551 (5th Cir. 1959). (Emphasis added.)
I See, e.g., Ford Motor Co. v. Huffman, 345 U.S. 330 (1953), and Pellicer
v. Brotherhood of Railway Clerks, 217 F. 2d 205 (5th Cir. 1954).
"' When the Steele doctrine is invoked in racial cases, it is the good faith
of the union vis-a-vis the minority - not vis-a-vis the company - thlat is
the test of nondiscriminatory negotiation. The Court of Appeals in Whitfield ignored this distinction. For discussion of the good faith standard in
the different context of NLRA Sec. 8(b) (3), see text at notes 192-201 infra.
"' See Mount v. Brotherhood of Locomotive Eng'rs, 226 F. 2d 004 (6th
Cir. 1955), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 967 (1956).
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by which some of the whites were hired. If it be objected
that the courts cannot foist such a settlement upon private
litigants, then at least they should refrain from sanctioning
agreements of lesser, pragmatic justice.
3. Denial of Union Membership
The fact that the Syres and Whitfield litigation was conducted against fully integrated bargaining agents does not
necessarily negate the proposition that Negroes within
unions are less likely to be discriminated against as a
minority."' The argument is that if Negroes belong to the
union, can communicate their economic needs to the leadership and hold intra-union political power, the potential for
unfair distinctions in collective bargaining will be reduced.
This position finds support even in exceptional situations
where integrated unions have been sued. In such cases, the
bargaining agent has always freely acknowledged its Steele
duty, the controversy being confined to whether or not it
had fulfilled that responsibility.
Denial of participation in union decision making may
take at least two forms: outright exclusion from membership; or relegation to a segregated

-

or "auxiliary"

-

local

under the domination of the nearest white local. The first
system was attacked directly for the first time in Oliphant
v. Brotherhood of Locomotive Firemen,119 where the Negro
plaintiffs sought an order requiring their admission on the
ground that their recognized bargaining agent negotiated
contractual provisions which resulted in a loss of income
to them, in violation of the fifth amendment. The district
court 120 and the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals dismissed
the complaint, finding the Brotherhood's certification under
the Railway Labor Act insufficient to make its subsequent
discriminatory conduct the equivalent of federal action.
The Supreme Court denied certiorari, "in view of the
abstract context in which the questions sought to be raised
are presented by this record."''
118
Compare

Rauh, Civil Rights and Liberties and Labor Unions, 8 LAB.

L.J. 874, 875 (1957), with Wellington, Union Democracy and Fair Representation: Federal Responsibility in a Federal System, 67 YALE L.J. 1327.
1342 and 1356-57 (1958).
"262 F. 2d 359 (6th Cir. 1958), cert. denied, 359 U.S. 935 (1959).
10 56 F. Supp. 89 (N.D. Ohio 1957).
21 359 U.S. 935 (1959).
Plaintiffs no

doubt found this cryptic remark
intolerably ironic, in view of the Brotherhood's long, non-abstract history
of discriminatory conduct, beginning with the bankground of the Steele
case itself. The Oliphant decision was anticipated by Ross v. Ebert, 275
Wisc. 523, 82 N.W. 2d 315, 2 RACE Rnr,. L. REPr. 648 (1957).

In

spite of

equally clear evidence of discriminatory denial of membership, garnered
by the state FEPC (see previous developments at 1 RACE REL. L. REP. 909
(1956) and 2 RACE Rr. L. REP. 151 (1956)), the Wisconsin courts could
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The second Howard case, begun in December, 1962,
may provide the concrete opportunity required by the
Court. The plaintiffs in this case likewise are seeking to
enjoin "the defendant Brotherhood from denying and refusing membership in the Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen to plaintiff and to the class he represents."' 2 2 Even if
Howard wins the second round, there is no indication that
the Trainmen will open their ranks for the wholesale entrance of Negro porters. Previously, under governmental
compulsion,' 23 the Trainmen adopted the rule that their
exclusion policy should not apply where it would be in
violation of law, presumably included court orders. But
"they have the black ball, although ostensibly they have
this principle."' 2 4 If a contempt proceeding in Cincinnati
(by Oliphant) or Memphis (by Howard) should succeed,
it is unlikely that excluded Negroes elsewhere would find
it feasible to rely on this complicated and expensive process
to gain admission.
As for the elimination of segregated locals, two as yet
isolated state developments represent the only judicial
accomplishments in the exercise of Steele theory. In Betts
find no constitutional or statutory right of the plaintiffs to be admitted
to the Bricklayers Union. Soon after this decision, however, the AFL-CIO
Civil Rights Committee persuaded the Bricklayers local to admit Negroes.
Subsequently, the Wisconsin fair employment practices statute was amended
to allow enforcement of the commission's "recommendations" in equity
by an aggrieved party against a non-complying party. WIS. STAT. ANN. SEC.
111.36(3) (1964 'Supp.); see Fleischman, Labor and the Civil Rights
Revaluation, Naw LuAEa., April 18, 1960. It should be noted that Menifee
v. local 74, Lathers Union, 3 RAca REL. L. REP. 507 (N.D. Ill. 1958), is the
only reported case in which the defendant consented to a decree enjoining
it from denying membership to Negro applicants. Since that decree, "all
Negroes who desire membership in Local 74 are now admitted; and all
.discriminatory practices have ceased." Letter to the writer from George
N. Leighton, attorney for plaintiff Negroes, March 5, 1963. "The best
estimate is that there are perhaps a score of Negro journeymen in the
Local Union at the present time." Letter to the writer from Leo Segall,
attorney for Local 74, March 12, 1963. The complaint in Menifee, hbwever,
was drawn exclusively in terms of anti-trust violations; the apparent
membership "victory", therefore, can hardly be scored in the Steele
doctrine column.
'=Howard v. St. Louis-S.F. Ry., Civil Action No. 62 C 358 (3), United
States District Court for the Eastern District of Missouri, Eastern
Division, Amended Complaint 8 (December 12, 1962). If the Supreme
Court's denial of. review in Oliphant and the trial examiner's reluctance to
rest his decertificatton order on the constitutional ground in Hughes Tool
Co., discussed beginning ait note 187 infra, may be regarded as advice
from the bench, the N.A.A.C.P. may be expected to de-emphasize the
"governmeiltal action" argument In Howard and other future cases where
the membership issue arises.
'2
Subsequent to the decision of the court in Railway Mail Ass'n v. Corsi,
326 U.S. 88 (1945).
"I Testimony of Charles Houston, General Counsel for the Negro Railway
Labor Executives Committee, Hearings, supra note 16, at 133.
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v. Easley,12' the Kansas Supreme Court found illegal federal action by segregated locals of the Brotherhood of Railway Carmen. Negro and white carmen employed by the
Santa Fe Railway had been members of an integrated company union, but, soon after certification by the National
Mediation Board, the Brotherhood undertook to establish
separate lodges. The larger Negro lodge was dominated by
white Local 850 in convention representation, grievance
handling and collective bargaining. The court enjoined
the Brotherhood from acting as bargaining agent for the
Negro workers as long as the latter "are not given equality
in privileges and participation in union affairs.' 1 26 Today,
"the union is composed of approximately 400 members,
white, Negro, and Latin American workers.... [E]ven
though the total of the Negro and Latin American
membership is in the minority, there have been numerous Negro presidents over the years since the decision was rendered. Presently, Negroes hold the positions of president, 1'financial
secretary and local chair27
man of the union.'
The second result of judicial action occurred almost
simultaneously in California, where courts had long barred
closed-shop bargaining agents from maintaining closed
unions. In three actions brought against the Boilermakers
Local No. 6,128 the union was given the alternatives of
dropping its color bar or refraining from inducing the
Negro plaintiffs' discharge because of their refusal to join
Auxiliary A-41. In Williams v. InternationalBhd. of Boilermakers,2 9 the court met the employers' argument that they
had no way of ascertaining the Negroes' status when faced
with a union demand for their discharge. Placing responsibility for compliance with the injunction squarely on the
Boilermakers, the court said it would allow the employers
in the future to accept at face value union statements that
Negroes who had been offered full membership had failed
to maintain good standing under the closed shop agreement. In Thompson v. Moore Drydock Co.,1 ' a companion
case, the fact that some of the plaintiffs had already joined
the auxiliary local did not constitute a waiver of their
1161 Kan. 459, 169 P. 2d 831 (1946).
Id. at 466.

12'Letter to the writer from Elmer C. Jackson, Jr., attorney for plaintiff
Negroes, January 5, 1963.
'1, See cases cited notes 71-73 supra and accompanying text.
L227 Cal. 2d 586, 1G5 P. 2d 903 (1946).
1"27 Cal. 2d 595, 165 P. 2d 901 (1946).

MARYLAND LAW REVIEW

[VOL. XXIV

objections to second-class status, which the court found to
be against public policy.
The plaintiffs in Conley v. Gibson131 originally sought a
declaration that segregated locals were "illegal" and an injunction against the enforcement of the Railway Clerks'
requirement that the plaintiffs join Negro Local 6051 in
order to retain their union membership. Neither of these
claims was ever passed upon, and since the cause was ultimately dismissed without a hearing on the merits, 132 it is
possible that these discriminatory practices continue today.
This assumption may not be unwarranted in light of the
fact that the Brotherhood of Railway and Steamship
Clerks, whose president 133 is a member of the AFL-CIO
Civil Rights Committee, still maintains segregated locals
(and separate seniority rosters) in New York, Tulsa, St.
Louis, and Minneapolis."4
B. Damages
In much of the litigation protesting unions' breaches
of their Steele duty, plaintiffs have included demands for
the recovery of compensatory and punitive damages. The
problems involved in pursuing these claims may be conveniently handled under the following headings: (1) From
whom - union, employer, or both - may they be recovered? (2) How should they be computed? (3) May punitive damages be recovered absent a showing of particular
injury?
The cases are in accord that damages for discrimination
effected by actual or constructive collusion between union
and employer recovered against both." 5 Plaintiffs may re13 138 F. Supp. 60 (S.D. Tex. 1955).
'1
See text at notes 79-93 8upra.
11George M. Harrison, after whom is named all-white Lodge 783, which
has yet to merge with (Negro) Friendship Lodge 6118, despite an order
to do so from the New York State Commission Against Discrimination.
11Hill, Labor Unions and the Negro: The Record of Discrimination,28
CO-MMENTARY 479, 485 (1959).
13 See, e.g., Rolax v. Atlantic Coast Line R.R., 186 F. 2d 473 (4th Cir.
1951); Dillard v. Chesapeake & 0. Ry., 136 F. Supp. 689 (S.D. W.Va.
1955); Central of Ga. Ry. v. Jones, 229 F. 2d 648 (5th Cir. 1956). For a
contrary view, see Judge 'Brown's dissent in Jones, at 649:
"Sto while the Railroad knew all the while thiat the Brotherhood was
not fulfilling its duties, it was not up to it either to demand a change
or prick the conscience of its adversary.
"If it had no duty to make its adversary bargain better, on what
ground can it be made to pay for that which such energetic, conscientious bargaining might have produced?"
Ironically, "the plaintiffs did collect some damages in Jones, after the
denial of certiorari. Those damages were paid by the Railroad." Letter to
the writer from Jerome A. Cooper, attorney for plaintiff Negroes, March
19. 1964.
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quest a specific allotment of liability, but more frequently
they have won the right to choose between joint tortfeasors by seeking the broadest possible allocation. 3 ' The
fact that the plaintiffs in some cases ended by recovering
no cash at all is no yardstick of their net success where
the money claim has been transparently tactical. For
example, the following claims for damages were wholly
omitted from eventual "settlements":
Case

Butler v. Celotex Corp. 137 ............ . .. . . .. . . . .. . .
Conley v. G ibson 8 ................... . . . . .. . . .. . . .. . . . .. . .
Graham v. Southern Ry. 139 ........................
Jones v. Distillery Workers 4 ° ..................
Menifee v. Local 74, Lathers Union' ......
Richardson v. Texas & N. 0. Ry .............

Minimum
Compensatory
Damages Sought

$150,000
75 ,00 0

50,000
250,000
80,000
100,000

Since the aim of these actions was invariably to compel
the bargaining agent to conform to fair-representation
standards, and since abandonment of discriminatory practices usually costs the employer little, the inference may
be drawn that the unions' risk of financial loss is one upon
which plaintiffs may profitably concentrate.
Psychological considerations may also be important
when damages are asked as compensation for past discrimination. Where the defendant union has evinced little
promise of serious reform, Negroes have had no reason not
See, e.g., Sells v. International Bhd. of Firemen and Oilers, 190 F. Supp.
857 (W.D. Pa. 1961).
" 3 RACE REL. L. REP. 503 (E.D. La. 1958). Letter to the writer from
M. C. Strittmatter, Vice President for Industrial Relations, The Celotex
Corporation, March 23, 1964.
131138 F. Supp. 60 (S.D. Tex. 1955), 6 RACE RE.. L. REP. 818 (S.D.
Tex. 1961).
m74 F. Supp. 663 (D.D.C. 1947). Letter to the writer from Henry L.
Walker, Vice President, Southern Railway System, February 15, 1963.
"'5 RACE REr.. L. REP. 786 (W.D. Ky. 1900). Letter to the writer from
James A. Crumlin, attorney for plaintiff Negroes, March 2, 1963.
113 RACE REL. L. REv. 507 (N.D. Ill. 1958). "[O]ur purpose at the time
in settling the litigation by means of a Consent Decree was to avoid the
tremendous costs which are incurred in trying any anti-trust case ...
Some money was paid to the plaintiffs on Count I, but the amount bore
no relationship to the claims asserted by the plaintiffs and was also, in our
opinion, predicated upon what we anticipated our costs of litigation
would be." Letter to the writer from Leo Segall, attorney for Local 74,
March 12, 1963.
111140
F. Supp. 215 (S.D. Tex. 1956). Judgment, Civil Action No. 9240.
United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas, Houston
Division, November 8, 1960. Letter to the writer from James M. Neel,
attorney for Texas & New Orleans Railroad, February 12, 1963.

MARYLAND LAW REVIEW

[VOL. XXIV

to press for whatever they might win. 4 ' The same is true
where a change in union conduct would have little ameliorative effect on Negroes' employment status, as in situations
where automation has been wiping out white and Negro
job prospects,' or where the plaintiffs are too old to be
affected by any injunctive decree.'4 5 But the setting is
quite different in Syres-type litigation, where the decision
to press for large damages may directly affect the very
solution which the defendants have already worked out.
Maintaining an action against one's union brothers - however recent or superficial the family connection may be clearly is not the most prudent method of gaining
friends during the initial period of workers' resentment
over integration.'46
The difficulty in arriving at a consistent theory for computing compensatory damages has foiled several plaintiffs
who did pursue their claims. The rule has been well settled
that individual plaintiffs must show deprivation of their
particular rights before4 recovery
in behalf of the class they
18
represent may be had. 7 In Clark v. Norfolk & W. Ry.,
the plaintiff who had retired before he had an opportunity
to qualify as a car retarder operator was awarded $1800;
two other plaintiffs who had failed or neglected to qualify
8See, e.g., Graham v. Brotherhood of Locomotive Firemen, 338 U.S. 232
(1949); Brotherhood of Locomotive Firemen v. Mitchell, 190 F. 2d 308
(5th Cir. 1951); Rolax v. Atlantic Coast Line R.R., 186 F. 2d 473 (4th
Cir. 1951).
'" See, e.g., King v. Atlantic Coast Line R.R., 303 F. 2d 274 (5th Cir.
1962), 323 F. 2d 1005 (5th Cir. 1963). "The employees in question are all
Carmen Helpers, whose duties consist largely of manual labor around the
cars. I imagine that a large part of their work was formerly oiling and
packing wheel boxes. The amount of this work, however, has been drastically reduced as a result of the introduction by the railroad of Timpken
roller bearings and lubricator pads. Formerly wheel boxes had to be
lubricated and packed every day or so, sometimes more frequently. Apparently with the new equipment, this task need be performed only once every
several months." Letter to the writer from William H. Adams III, attorney
for the Carmen, February 12, 1963.
10 See, e.g., Sells v. International Bhd. of Firemen and Oilers, 190 F.
Supp. 857 (W.D. Pa. 1961) ; and Clark v. Norfolk & W. Ry., 3 RACE RM.
L. Rmp. 988 (W.D. Va. 1958).
I "The integration of the Gulf refinery at Port Arthur was accompanied
by a great deal of resentment, recalcitrance, and some passion on the part
of the white employees. Even after the plant was integrated, the Negro
employees, following suit, saw fit to maintain their action for damages
against their union brothers. However, at the present time the Gulf
refinery is operating satisfactorily without incident, and the presence of
the Negroes in the operation and mechanical departments has given management no operational problems at all." Letter to the writer from Chris
Dixie, attorney for Local 23 in Syres, January 18, 1963.
"I Syres v. Oil Workers, 257 F. 2d 479 (5th Cir. 1958), cert. denied, 358
U.S. 929 (1959).
" 3 RACE REL. L. Rn. 988 (W.D. Va. 1958).
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won $1 each. On remand in Conley v. Gibson,14 9 defendants' motion for summary judgment as to two plaintiffs
who had died was granted, as no substitution under Rule
25(a) had been ordered. Conley himself had disappeared,'50
and the remaining representative's deposition showed no
individual loss of time, pay or seniority rights. On these
facts, the district court had no alternative but to grant a
judgment of dismissal of the class action.
The Syres case dramatically illustrates the damages
problems inherent in class actions under the Steele doctrine. On remand from the Supreme Court,' 5 ' Local 254
withdrew from the case as a party plaintiff, but plaintiffs
Syres and Warrick persevered in their class action for damages suffered as a result of the discriminatory original
contract. The trial was before an all-white jury which
"found that there was no conspiracy between the company
and the union in the designing of the old contract, and
that all of the provisions of the old contract rested upon
relevant factors as defined in the Steele decision.' 52 The
plaintiffs probably could have attacked this jury finding as
unsupported by the evidence and contrary to the requirements of Steele as a matter of law. 153 Instead, they propounded a theory of damages which claimed a lump sum
recovery to be divided among the plant's Negroes, with6 RACE REL. L. REP. 818 (S.D. Tex. 1961). 138 F. Supp. 60, aff', 229 F.
2d t m436, rev'd, 355 U.S. 41 ( ...... ).
'
"The other living pliantiff, J. D. Conley, who was described by his
counsel as 'a sort of transient person', did not appear and his counsel
asserted his inability to locate him" for the taking of depositions. Letter to
the writer from Edward J. Hickey, Jr., attorney for Railway Clerks,
February 1, 1963. Conley's default gave the district court an alternative
ground for dismissal under RULE.37 (d), F.R. Civ. P.
In Syres v. Oil Workers, 350 U.S. 892 (1955).
12 Letter to the writer from Chris Dixie, attorney for Local 23, January
18, 1963.
This would be true even though the established discriminatory practices existed at least partially at the insistence of the joint owner of the
statutory bargaining power (Local 254). "The Steele decision came into
existence as a result of predatory attacks conducted during the depression
by the white railroad unions who covered the Negroes' jobs. . . . [T]he
activities of the railway Brotherhoods were well known to the Negro communities of the South during the CIO organizing campaigns in the late
1930's and early 1940's. The result was that while the Negroes were willing
to have unions, especially CIO unions, they very frequently extracted
promises from their white co-workers that the jobs would remain divided
as is. That is to say, the Negroes caused the whites to promise them that
the existing ratio between white and Negro jobs would remain the same,
and this is a part of the historical background in the South which caused
practically all of the industrial plants in this area to be divided along racial
lines. During the 1950's the Negroes demanded abandonment of the old
system and adoption of integrated seniority lines, and this is where the
Syres case came in." Letter to the writer from Chris Dixie, attorney for
Local 23, January 18, 1963. See Marshall, Racial Factors Influencing Entry
Into the Skill Trades, TI ECONOMICS OF HUMAN REsoURcEs 23, 32 (1963).
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out the requisite showing of particular injuries. The Court
of Appeals refused to permit such a computation by averages and dismissed the case.'
While exact proof of the
amount may not be required, 155 plaintiffs must show for
each individual who is to recover some differential between what he did earn and what he might have earned
without discriminatory disadvantage.
However long-standing or easily proven unions' breaches
of their Steele obligations may be, the courts have agreed
that plaintiffs' damages claims are cut off by the local
statute of limitations. In Jones v. Central of Georgia Ry., 1 6
Negroes had been denied work in certain positions for over
thirty years, but the Alabama statute limited their money
recovery to one year before the filing of their action. This
principle was paid lip service in a case in which punitive
damages were awarded,'157 and in another in which the
plaintiff lost by directed verdict. 15 Punitive damages,
which are not subject to such limitation, have been utilized
as an incentive to quick settlement in conformity with
Steele principles and as compensation in cases where union
reform would be unlikely or of no practical value to the
particular complainants. Both of these aspects were present
in Clark v. Norfolk & W. Ry."59 where the trial judge had
no way of predicting whether the plaintiffs would ever
qualify as car retarder operators, even with cooperative
instruction from the Trainmen. Although the three old
Negroes could not show actual detriment or an amount of
damages capable of ascertainment, the court awarded each
of them $1,000 "punitive" damages. This technique of
assigning liability, however, is probably confined to the
set of facts peculiar to the Clark case.
In the twenty years since the Steele decision, Negro
plaintiffs have claimed upwards of $6,000,000 in compensatory and punitive damages. They have actually collected
$2,802 of the former and $3,000 of the latter. These figures
indicate that while damages for breach of a union's fairrepresentation duty may not be prominent in plaintiffs' real
expectations, they are an essential part of the strategy of
1"257 F. 2d 479 (5th Cir. 1958).
'Mitchell v. Gulf, M. & 0. R.R., 91 F. Supp. 175 (N.D. Ala. 1950), aff'd
sub nom. Mitchell v. Brotherhood of Locomo)tive Firemen and Enginemen,
190 F. 2d 308 (5th Cir. 1951).
229 P. 2d 648 (5th Cir. 1956), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 848 (1956).
Clark v. Norfolk & W. Ry., 3 RACE REL. L. REP. 988 (W.D. Va. 1958).
Sells v. International 2Bhd. of Firemen and Oilers, 190 F. Supp. 857
(W.D. Pa. 1961) ; letter to the writer from Loyal H. Gregg, attorney for the
Brotherhood, February 14, 1963.
13 RACE Rmr. L. REP. 993 (W.D. Va. 1956) (injunction); 3 RACE REL. L.
REP. 988 (W.D. Va. 1958) (damages).
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invoking judicial coercion. The intransigent Brotherhood of
Locomotive Firemen and Enginemen, for example, agreed
to abandon the SCCA in practiceonly after Tunstall pressed
his suit for $4,000,000; the fact that Tunstall would ultimately recover a paltry $1,000 could not be reliably predicted by the Firemen. Furthermore, if damages for a
particular unfair practice are once awarded, their memory
may serve as a deterrant to future discriminatory schemes

contemplated by a union. If the employer has been found
jointly liable, its penalty may also be an incentive to

greater resistance against bargaining agent demands for
mistreatment of minorities. 160

Not all plaintiffs since Steele have won their cases on
the merits, and not all of those who have won have been

reimbursed for the expenses of victory. Most have been
able to tax costs to the unions, 10 1 but in only three of the
cases did the defendants pay the plaintiffs' attorneys' fees.'62
The terms of two reported settlements also included such

an allowance. 6 3 In one instance, an international union
sided with the Negro plaintiffs but dropped out of the
case when the discriminatory arrangement was modified,

and the plaintiffs continued to press their damage claims
against the local.'
In another, the same international
played an active role in settling the case favorably for the
plaintiffs and later undertook to pay the local's share of
their attorneys fees; fifty percent of these costs were borne
by the company.'6 5
11 On -the other hand, the employer faced with demands for discriminatory
provisions may not have to bargain at all.
u Including the plaintiffs in all the Firemen and Trainmen litigation.
2 Clark v. Norfolk & W. Ry., 3 RACE REL. L. REP. 988 (W.D.Va. 1958);
Mitchell v. Gulf, M. & 0. R.R., 91 F. Supp. 175 (N.D. Ala. 1950) ; Rolax v.
Atlantic Coast Line R.R., 186 F. 2d 473 (4th Cir. 1951).
"'Dillard v. Chesapeake & 0. Ry., last reported at 136 F. Supp. 689
(S.D. W.Va. 1955), "was disposed of by settlement in an amount which
took care of plaintiffs' costs, attorneys' fees, etc." Letter to the writer
from Amos A. Bolen, attorney for the Chesapeake & Ohio Railway Company, February 12, 1963. In Menifee v. Local 74, Lathers Union, 3 RACE
REL. L. RE'. 507 (N.D. Ill. 1958), "treble damages plus attorneys' fees
and costs were sought. We had anticipated that if a trial was had before
a jury the actual recovery of damages against the union would have been
in the neighborhood of $250,000. Such a trial, however, would have been
quite extensive and costly. As a consequence, the consent decree was
entered into, and the plaintiffs were paid $10,000 cash by the defendants."
Letter to the writer from George N. Leighton, attorney for plaintiff Negroes,
March 5, 1963.
"I Syres v. Oil Workers, 257 F. 2d 479 (5th Cir. 1958).
1'Butler v. Celotex Corp., 3 RACE REL. L. Rm. 503 (E.D. La. 1958).
Letter from William E. Rentfro, General Counsel, Oil, Chemical and Atomic
Workers International Union, to Willie Bates, President of Local 4-179,
March 13, 1958:
"Although the International Union was never served and never became an actual party-defendant to these proceedings, we were instru-
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C. A PartialSummary
While the Steele line of cases may have settled the substantive law governing unions' duty of fair representation,
skilled defendants' attorneys have been able to delay hearings on the merits of plaintiffs' claims until years after the
discriminatory faits accomplis. 16 6 Where the courts have
been sidetracked by procedural niceties of process, venue
and pleading requirements, delays in granting relief have
had the same practical effects as denial of protection.
Moreover, the appealability of interlocutory decisions, however essential to the judicial process, permits irremediable
attenuation of the urgent search for protection. Beyond
mental in convincing the company that the matter should be settled
across the bargaining table rather than in federal court. We also followed the negotiations very closely and certified to the federal court that
the stipulation for settlement had the approval of the International
Union. . . . Early in negotiations, counsel for the plaintiffs requested,
as a part of the settlement, that they be paid by the defendants, attorneys' fees in the amount of $5,000. This Was a class action which
certain members of the Local were forced to bring in order to enforce
their rights. Under these circumstances, the court would have jurisdiction to assess attorneys' fees against the defendants. . . . I discussed
the matter with President Knight and he agreed that, under the circumstances of this case, and since Local 4-179 would be obligated to
pay substantial attorneys' fees to its local counsel, the International
Union would voluntarily pay Local 4-179's share of any attorneys' fees
that may be assessed by the court against the Company and the
Local . . . It was finally agreed that the court would be requested
to award attorneys' fees to counsel for the plaintiffs In the amount of
$3,000. This order will be directed against the Local Union and the
Oompany jointly, but the International Union will voluntarily pay the
Local's Union share when the order is issued. In view of the Company's willingness to agree to a $5,000 fee for plaintiffs' counsel, it
should be apparent that the fees collected by the attorneys for the Company in this matter were considerably higher."
1 Despite the Steele decision, inferior courts continued to dismiss actions
to enforce the duty of fair representation, on the ground that plaintiffs
failed to exhaust their administrative remedies. In Dillard v. Chesapeake
& 0. Ry., 199 F. 2d 948 (4th Cir. 1952), Negro machinists' helpers and
laborers sued to put an end to discriminatory denials of promotions collusively perpetuated by the railway management and System Federation
No. 41. The district court dismissed the complaint for lack of jurisdiction.
A year later, the dismissal was reversed and the cause remanded, ending in
"settlement" over five years after the suit for an injunction had been
instituted. Letter to the writer from Strother Hynes, General Solicitor,
Chesapeake & Ohio Railway Company, January 31, 1963. Conley v. Gibson,
355 U.S. 41 (1957), reversing 229 F. 2d 436 (5th Cir. 1956), in which the
plaintiffs sued to prevent impending abolition of their jobs and seniority
rights, went to the Supreme Court for a determination of the jurisdictional
issue almost four years after the filing of the complaint. In Richardson v.
Texas & N.O. R.R., 140 F. Supp. 215 (S.D. Tex. 1956), rev'd, 242 F. 2d 230
(5th Cir. 1957), Negro yardmen's grievance over the assignment of junior
whites as engine foremen on Negro crews was accorded similar treatment
by the district court which had dismissed Conley. The plaintiffs' claims
were "settled" by a consent judgment almost five years after presentation
to the trial court. Letter to the writer from George L. Schmidt, attorney for
the Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen, February 5, 1963.
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this, the duplication of effort required in invoking geographically particular sanctions against regional bargaining misconduct - e.g., in the southern railroad industry limits the effectiveness of all but the best organized attacks.
In a few instances, the occasional unrealism or incompetence of the judges charged with enforcement of the
Steele doctrine have led plaintiffs down the road to frustration, if not despair. The "appropriate forum" hurdle is
both institutional and idiosyncratic.
As for the effectiveness of injunctive relief, the decrees
which ultimately issued were never as comprehensive as
those which the plaintiffs had requested. 6 7 Compliance
with even a limited decree, moreover, depends upon the
original plaintiffs' access to information about the continuing bargaining conduct of the offending union. Where
Negroes are excluded from membership or participation,
awareness of threatening maltreatment may come too hard
and too late. Even where it is possible to ascertain the
degree of defendants' "compliance", the potential for subtle
evasion of any injunction - by "reasonable" bargaining,
calculated to affect Negro workers adversely' 68 - makes
contempt proceedings an unwieldy and impractical method
of guaranteeing fair treatment.
In many situations, the courts cannot affort plaintiffs a
full measure of practical relief, no matter how ready they
stand to do so. The previous duration of discriminatory
practices has been deemed irrelevant to the "reasonableness" of their modification and rejected as a standard for
measuring compensatory damages. More important,
"the efforts of Negroes to enjoy equal job opportunity
have been frustrated by the contracting economy.
Never forget that the Syres and Whitfield plans have
been overtaken by economic pressures which cause the
labor force as a whole to come down the ladder rather
than to occupy new jobs and new openings. . . . A
part of this comes from business conditions and the
1 The relief sought in the complaint in Rolax v. Atlantic Coast Line R.R.,
91 F. Supp. 585 (E.D. Va. 1950), may be taken as typical:
(1) a declaratory judgment stating the parties' respective rights
and duties;
(2) discovery of pending or negotiated agreements on job assignments or other employment rights;
(3) an injunction against recognition of the SCCA;
(4) an injunction against the Brotherhood of Locomotive Firemen
and Enginemen from representing the firemen's craft as long as
it refused to represent the plaintiffs in good faith;
(5) damages, compensatory and punitive, for violation of the plaintiffs' seniority rights; and
(6) an order restoring the plaintiffs' seniority rights.
us Cf. Marshall v. Central of Georgia Ry., 268 F. 2d 445 (5th Cir. 1959).
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other part from the gradual encroachments of auto"169
mation ..
This explains how the railroad Brotherhoods can continue
to deprive Negroes of jobs by means of spread-the-work
schemes, and of equal pay through spurious craft classifications. 171 It also means that the "compromises" effected in
southern industrial plants bear the promise of real integration only for the next generation of Negro workers.
Although plaintiffs' damages claims have enjoyed a
comparatively small measure of satisfaction, in terms of the
amounts actually collected, their collateral function in
judicial proceedings under Steele doctrine should not be
disregarded. Obviously, a union faced with a class action,
in which the plaintiffs' cumulated claims may represent a
substantial sum, may be more defensively disposed toward
amicable settlement of the Negroes' grievances. The record
of petty collections indicates, however, that plaintiffs risk
heavy expenses in turning to the courts for relief. This
problem may be occasionally alleviated by the modest feesetting of local civil rights attorneys. But neither the prospect of winning costs nor the proximity of sympathetic
lawyers may be consistently relied upon by Negro workers
who seek judicial improvement of their situation.
II.

POTENTIAL

NLRB

ACTION

The National Labor Relations Board is the administrative agency charged with the primary enforcement 1 7' of
the federal labor statutes. 1 72 As such, it has two sets of
devices at its command for policing unions' breaches of
their Steele duty, both of which are continuing and prospective: (1) adjudication of unfair labor practices, with
wide choice of remedies for proven wrongs; and (2) refusal
to aid discriminatory unions in becoming or remaining
exclusive bargaining agents. Since the duty of fair representation is only implicit in the NLRA, the statute is silent
119Letter to the writer from Chris Dixie, attorney for Local 23 and
Local 2708, February 19, 1963.
170 Simon Howard may ultimately overcome these Trainmen tactics, for
the benefit of a dwindling number of Negro porters. But if any social predictions are possible after the recent resolution of the bitter dispute
between railroad management and unions, that detente spells the absolute
end for Negro firemen on American railroads.
",See San Diego Building Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236 (1959);
I.A.M. v. 'Gonzales, 356 U.S. 617 (1958); Guss v. Utah Labor Relations
Board, 353 U.S. 1 (1957); Weber v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 348 U.S. 468
(1955) ; Garner v. Teamsters Local 776, 346 U.S. 485 (1953).
'61 Stat. 136 (1947), as amended, 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-68 (1958), as
amended, 29 U.S.C. §§ 153-60 (Supp. IV 1959-62), amending 49 Stat.
449 (1935).
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on how that duty is to be enforced. What follows is an
exploration of the possibilities for such practical action.17"
A. Unfair Labor Practices
1. Section 8(b)(2)
174
The California cases led by James v. MarinshipCorp.
clearly indicates that the fair representation duty can preclude a union from instigating employer discrimination
against Negroes who have been denied full union membership. To some extent, Section 8(b) (2) fosters this result,
forbidding unions
"to cause or attempt to cause an employer ... to discriminate against an employee with respect to whom
membership in such organization has been denied or
terminated on some ground other than his failure to
tender the periodic dues and the initiation fees uniformly required as a condition of acquiring or retain-

ing membership.

.....175

Thus, the law is violated if Negro workers who have been
denied union membership are subsequently denied employment because they are not union members.'7 No case has
yet decided whether a union may object to a Negro's
employment on the basis of his race rather than his lack of
membership. When a Negro non-member is discriminated
against, however, white workers are likely to conclude that
it is best to be both white and a union member, and that
inference is sufficient encouragement of union membership
to fall within the prohibition of Section 8(b) (2).1
Until recently, the section afforded no aid to a Negro
who was admitted to union membership but discriminated
against on the job because of his race. In Miranda Fuel
"'See, generally, Sovern, The National Labor Relations Act and Racial
Discrimination, 62 COLUm. L. REv. 563 (1962); Cox, The Duty of Fair
Representation, 2 VILL. L. REv. 151, 172-75 (1957); Maloney, Racial and
Religious Discrimination in Employment and the Role of the NLRB, 21
M3b.L. REv. 219 (1961) ; Albert, NLRB-FEPC?, 16 VAND. L. Rv. 547 (1963) ;
GREENBEPG,

RACE

RELATIONS

AND

AmERIcAN

LAw

177-83 (1959).

The

ambition of the present discussion is to appraise the NLRB's practical
accomplishments, past and impending.
114 25 Cal. 2d 721, 155 P. 2d 329 (1944)
; see text at notes 75-78, supra.
'561 Stat. 141 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 158(b) (2) (1958).
As the late Senator Taft put it during the debate on .the bill that bore
his name:
"Let us take the case of unions which prohibit the admission of
Negroes to membership. If they prohibit the admission of Negroes to
membership, they may continue to do so; but representatives of the
union cannot go to the employer and say, 'You have got to fire this man
because he is not a member of our union'." 93 CONG. REc. 4193 (1947).
" See Radio Officers Union v. NLRB, 347 U.S. 17 (1954).
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Co., 17 8 a non-racial case, a majority of the Board held that

a labor organization violates Section 8(b) (2) when
"for arbitrary or irrelevant reasons or upon the basis
of an unfair classification the union attempts to cause
or does cause an employer to derogate the employment
status of an employee. . . . [Ulnion membership is
encouraged or discouraged whenever a union causes
an employer to affect an individual's employment
status ....

"179

This broadly stated rule extended the principle laid down
in NLRB v. Gaynor News Co.,'80 where the respondent
company was found to have violated the act by giving certain wage and vacation payments to union members only.
Enforcement of the Board's Miranda Section 8(b) (2) finding was denied, however, in a split decision by the Second
Circuit Court of Appeals. s"' Judges Medina and Lumbard
disagreed with the Board's reading of Local 357, IBT v.
NLRB, 1 12 that a Section 8(b) (2) violation does not necessarily flow from conduct which has the foreseeable result
of encouraging membership, but that, given such "foreseeable result", the finding of a violation may turn upon an
evaluation of the disputed conduct "in terms of legitimate
employer or union purposes." The court held that an
unfair labor practice has been committed only if the discrimination is deliberately designed to encourage membership in the union.8 3 If the position of the majority of
the Board were sustained, Judge Medina noted, the Board
would be inundated with charges of racial discrimination
at the hands of bargaining agents. 8 4
N.L.R.-B. 181, 51 L.R.R.M. 1584 (1962).
Id. at 200. (Emphasis added.) Even the dissenters noted that "the
reduction of Lopuch's seniority for his absence from work is a far cry
from the arbitrary and invidious discrimination" in cases such as Steele.
'w347 U.S. 17 (1954).
NLRB v. Miranda Fuel Oo., 326 F. 2d 172 (2d Cir. 1963).
18365 U.S. 667 (1961).
326 F. 2d 17, 180 (2d Cir. 1963).
2" The amici curiae briefs filed by the N.A.A.C.P.
and the A.C.L.U. appear
to assume that it is in the public interest to have such controversies
channeled into the administrative machinery of the NLRB, where the
remedy of reinstatement with back pay is available. Judge Medina considered this assumption to be a matter of "policy" to be determined by
Congress. In the view of dissenting Judge Friendly, Congress has already
made this determination in passing the prohibition contained in Sec.
8(b) (2). He finds it desirable to channel such cases intD the NLRB, since
the ability of the aggrieved employee to proceed in court against the employer is seriously limited by the usual arbitration provisions, which only
the union may enforce.
128140

'

8
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Before the Second Circuit's Miranda decision was rendered, the trial examiner in the latest Hughes Tool Co."8 5
case supplied the final requisite step in the process of
broadening Section 8(b) (2) to cover union indifference to
racially invidious treatment:
"What is said in Miranda with respect to union
action would appear equally applicable to inaction
which was founded upon 'arbitrary or irrelevant reasons or upon the basis of an unfair classification'. I find,
therefore, that Local l's failure to process or investigate Davis' grievance violated Section... 8(b) (2) ...
of the Act."'""
Even after the denial of enforcement in Miranda, another trial examiner evaded the Second Circuit opinion
by manipulating Justice Harlan's explanation of Gaynor
in his Local 357 concurrence: 8 7
"Having found that the joint bargaining representative ... instigated the execution... of the contract's
1962 extension, including the discriminatory work
quotas, that the Association was thereby caused to
execute and to maintain and enforce the contract containing these provisions which naturally and foreseeably encouraged or discouraged union activities of its
employees, and that no legitimate union or employer
justification for these acts has been shown, I find and
conclude that the Respondents by their conduct violated Sec. 8(b) (2) of the Act."' 8
The General Counsel had offered a simpler theory in this
case, following the trial examiner's reasoning in Hughes
Tool Co. The application of seventy-five percent to twentyfive percent work quotas in the contract based on race and
union membership, he argued, discriminated against Negro
employees in violation of Section 8(a) (3).. It was within
the white local's power to accomplish a termination or
modification of this discriminatory condition; they were
requested by the Negro local to do so, but refused. By
m Case No. 23-CB-429, 52 L.R.R. 247 (1963). Previous Board decisions
concerning there parties are reported in 119 N.L.R.B.. 739 (1957); 104
N.L.R.B. 318 (1953) ; 100 N.L.RB. 208 (1952) ; 97 N.L.RB. 1107 (1952);
88 N.L.R.B. 1039 (1950) ; 85 N.L.R.B. 663 (1949) ; 77 N.L.R.B. 1193 (1948);
69 N.L.R.B. 294 (194); 56 N.L.R.B. 981 (1944), modified, 147 P. 2d 69
(5th Cir. 1945); 53 N.L.R.B. 547 (1943); 45 N.LR.B. 821 (1942); 36
N.L.R.B. 904 (1941); 33 N.L.R.B. 1089 (1941); 27 N.LR.B. 836 (1940).
52 L.R.R. 247, Trial Examiner's Intermediate Report 17 (1963).
365 U.S. 667, 681 (1961).
Local 1367, ILA, 55 L.R.R. 138, Case No. 23-OB-476, Trial Examiner's
Decision 17 (1964).
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such refusal, he concluded, they caused the employer Association to continue the discriminatory condition, and thereby violated Section 8(b) (2).
2. Section 8(b)(3)
Section 8(b) (3) makes it an unfair labor practice for a
union "to refuse to bargain collectively with an employer,
provided it is the representative of his employees subject
to the provisions of section 9(a). '"119 Section 8(d) defines
"to bargain collectively" as "the performance of the mutual
obligation of the employer and the representative of the
employees to meet at reasonable times and confer in good
faith with respect to wages, hours, and other terms and
conditions of employment. . . ."190 Professor (now Solicitor
General) Cox has suggested that the duty "to confer in
good faith" extends to the employees represented by the
union. 9 ' Professor Sovern has challenged this position,
arguing that the obligations arising under Section 8(b) (3)
were intended merely to parallel the employer's obligations under Section 8(a) (5); since there can be no duty
of fair representation on the employer, "the duty to bargain collectively, then, probably does not include the duty
1 92
to represent fairly.'
Although the NLRB General Counsel declined to so
argue, the trial examiner in Hughes Tool Co. found that
the white local's refusal to investigate or process a Negro's
grievance violated Section 8(b) (3), reading the rule of
Conley v. Gibson'9' directly into the NLRA. Judge Medina's
opinion in Miranda Fuel Co. chose Sovern's analysis over
Cox's. The General Counsel's pro-Cox argument in Local
1367, ILA,
in the face of the Second Circuit's Miranda
decision on the issue, was rejected by the trial examiner
after careful review of the section's legislative history.
Acceptance of the expansive interpretation of Section
8(b) (3), apparently advocated for the present by the
General Counsel, could lead to full - but not necessarily
exclusive 9" - administrative enforcement of the duty of
fair representation in all areas of collective bargaining.
Even Professor Sovern does not find the provision useless:
"'61 Stat. 141 (1917), 29 U.S.C. § 158(b) (3) (1958).
'961 Stat. 142 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 158(d) (1958) (emphasis added.)
Cox, The Duty of FairRepresentation., 2 VILL. L. REV. 151, 172 (1957).
Sovern, The National Labor Relations Act ad Racial Discrimination,
62 CoL. L. REv. 563, 588-89 (1962).
"'355 U.S. 41 (1957), discussed at notes 79-83, 8upra.
19455 L.R.R. 138 (1964).
"'See cases cited note 174, supra; Sovern, supra note 195, at 608-13;
Albert, supra note 176, at 588.
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"Although the section seems not to afford workers
any direct protection, the duty it imposes on unions in
favor of employers has aspects that support the duty of
fair representation. In fact, a union plainly violates the
duty it owes to an employer if it makes and insists upon
a racially discriminatory demand under 8(b) (3)

.""'

The employer's action would rest upon its privilege lawfully to refuse to bargain about demands that the union
may not insist upon as a condition of reaching an agreement. 9 ' But such indirect protection of Negro workers'
rights, as its proponent concedes, would be ridiculously
weak. Indeed, the absence of even a single case applying
Section 8(b) (3) to strike down a racially discriminatory
demand demonstrates that employers rarely offer the assumed resistance. "[M]any discriminatory demands cost a
company nothing to grant, whereas resistance198may lead to
its having to yield on something expensive."'
3. Section 8(b)(1)(A)
In the past twelve years, the NLRB has nearly reversed
its position on the question whether a union's breach of its
duty to represent fairly is also a violation of Section
8(b) (1). In 1952, the General Counsel took the position
that despite the Supreme Court's decision in the Steele
case, and the application of that doctrine to the NLRA
in Wallace Corp. v. NLRB, 9 9 he could find nothing in the
Taft-Hartley Act which made it an unfair labor practice
to bargain discriminatorily and unfairly against excluded
minorities. In the amicus curiae brief filed with the
Supreme Court in Ford Motor Co. v. Huffman,200 decided in
1953, the Board and its counsel took the position that the
right to equal representation, in view of the absence of
affirmative legislative history, could not be found implicit
in Section 7 of the act, so as to render violations of that
right an unfair labor practice within Section 8(b) (1).
In 1954, the General Counsel affirmed a regional director's refusal to issue an 8(b) (1) complaint in a case where
a union failed to protest a company rule limiting Negro
job bids to the cleaning and sanitation departments.2"' In
1956, the General Counsel was asked to issue unfair labor
Sovern, supra note 176, at 589.
" NLRB v. Borg-Warner Corp., 356 U.S. 342 (1958).
Sovern, supra note 176, at 590.
' 323 U.S. 248 (1944).
'345 U.S. 330 (1953).
'Case No. 1047, 35 L.R.R.M. 1130 (1954). The union never explicitly
approved the rule or demanded its revision, in spite of a plant-wide-seniority
contract provision.
"9
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practice complaints against several employers and unions
on the ground that "the employers had discriminated
against (employees) on a racial basis upon demand by or
in conspiracy with (the) unions." He refused" 2 because
there was no evidence of attempts by the unions to cause
discrimination by the companies, and a mere failure to
move to eliminate employer discrimination does not violate
Section 8(b) (1). This ruling implied that if evidence of
union instigation were presented, the General Counsel
would issue an unfair labor practice complaint.
Two years later, in Local 229, United Textile Workers,2 °3
the Board sidled up to the proposition that a union violates
Section 8(b) (1) when it defaults on its duty of fair representation. The breach of duty was the union's exclusion
of non-union workers in the bargaining unit from the
benefits of a Health Trust Fund supported by their employer's contributions and administered by the union.
Although the result could easily have been reached without recourse to the doctrine of fair representation,2 4 the
trial examiner chose to support his decision with that
rationale, and the Board accepted his findings and conclusions without further comment.
The Local 229 hint was expanded into a general principle
in Miranda Fuel Co., when the Board deftly inserted the
"statutory" duty to deal fairly into the exclusive representation clause of Section 9 (a), incorporated that section
into the "employees' rights" wording of Section 7, and held
the breach of duty to be a violation of Section 8(b) (1):
".... Section 7 thus gives employees the right to be
free from unfair or irrelevant or invidious treatment
by their exclusive bargaining agent in matters affecting their employment. This right of employees is a
statutory limitation on statutory bargaining representatives, and we conclude that Section 8(b) (1) (A) of
the Act accordingly prohibits labor organizations, when
acting in a statutory representative capacity, from
taking action against any employee upon consideration
or classifications
which are irrelevant, invidious, or
205
unfair.

20 Case No. K-311, 37 L.R.R.M. 1457 (1956).
2120 NLRB 1700 (1958).
201The precedents clearly establish that when a union withholds from
non-union employees benefits financed by their employer, it restrains thbse
employees in their right - guaranteed by Sec. 7 - to refrain from becoming union members; see, e.g., Radio Officer's Union v. NLRB, 347 U.S. 17
(1954) ; Indiana Gas & Chemical Corp., 130 NLRB 1488 (1961) ; and Carty
Heating Corp., 117 NLR-B 1417 (1957).
140 NLRB 181, 185 (1962).

1964]

"FAIR REPRESENTATION" DOCTRINE

155

The turning point had definitely been passed, leaving undetermined only the a fortiori question "whether in certain
circumstances a union's unequal treatment, based on racial
considerations, of unit employees may not be an unfair
labor practice."20 6 Although the Board's order was denied
20 7
enforcement by the Second Circuit Court of Appeals,
only one of the three judges who participated in the case
took a position of outright rejection of the majority's theory
of the scope of the duty of fair representation. 0
The trial examiners' decisions in the latest Hughes Tool
Co. episode 2 9 and Local 1367, ILA,21 if accepted by the
Board and ultimately by the courts, will culminate the
administrative about-face on the question. In the first of
these cases, a joint certification had been issued to Independent Metal Workers Union Locals 1 (white) and 2
(Negro) as the bargaining representative of employees at
the Hughes Tool Company, Houston, Texas. Local 1, purporting to act as the certified representative, entered into
an agreement with the company in December, 1961, under
which certain jobs in the unit were open only to white
employees and others were open only to Negroes. A Negro
employee (the treasurer of Local 2) made a bid for an
apprenticeship which was denied by the company. Local 1
then summarily refused to investigate or process the
Negro's grievance, relying on the discriminatory contract.
The General Counsel cautiously limited his unfair labor
practice complaint - Local l's refusal to process a Negro
grievance was claimed to be a violation of Section 8 (b) ( 1)
only - probably because he also sought the broader remedy
of rescission of certification.
The trial examiner held that
"if a labor organization which is the exclusive bargaining representative declines to process the grievance
Office of the General Counsel, NLRB, Summary of Operations, 1962,
52 L.R.R. 6, 13 (1962) (emphasis added.)
9 3 26 F. 2d 172 (2d Cir. 1963), 54 L.R.R.M. 2715 (1963).
mThere is further uncertainty as to the position that the Board itself
might take if faced with the same questions again, since Member Rodgers
of the majority has now left the Board. The remaining members have
adhered to the positions they took in decisions since Miranda. In two later
cases, for exAmple, Chairman McCulloch concurred, In holdings that cleared
unions of unlawful discrimination charges but said that he did so for the
reasons set forth in his Miranda dissent; Members Leedom and Brown
applied the standards of the majority opinion in Miranda. Operating Engineers Union, 54 L.R.R.M. 1235 (1963) ; Typographical Union, 54 L.R.R.M.
1281 (1963). In a similar case decided by a four man Board, Chairman
McCulloch and Member Fanning concurred but added that they do so on
the Miranda dissent; Members Leedom and Brown Again applied the standards of the Miranda majority. Teamsters Union, 54 L.R.R.M. 1356 (1963).
52 L.R.R. 247 (1963).
210 Case No. 23-CB-476, 55 L.R.R. 138 (1964).
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of a member of the unit, it has to that extent refused to
represent him, and hence it has restrained or coerced
him in the exercise of his right to be represented....
The illegality of this inaction was not cured by the fact that
separate locals administered the two units (or two sections
of the same unit), since whatever arrangements may be
worked out between the recipients of a joint certification,
they must observe the same legal duties imposed on a
single representative with respect to full and fair representation of the unit. Furthermore, in the trial examiner's
view, the case was not rendered moot by the fact that
Local 1 had already approved amendments to its constitution and bylaws which would eliminate racial discrimination or the added fact that the new contract did not provide
for such discrimination.
In Local 1367, ILA, the controversy between two joint
bargaining segregated 212 locals centered about a hiring hall
"work sharing formula" that divided available work according to a seventy-five percent to twenty-five percent quota
system. Besides this racial division of longshoremen labor,
there were further understandings, incorporated by reference into the collective agreement, that Negroes and whites
could not comprise a "mixed gang", Negro and white gangs
could not work together in a single hatch on a ship, and
neither race could apply to the other's local for a job referral. Trial Examiner Kessel agreed with the General
Counsel's theory that
"the maintenance and enforcement . . . of the contractual provisions for the 75-25 percent division of work
between Locals 1367 and 1368 constitute unlawful conduct by the joint collective bargaining representative ... because these provisions discriminate against
a class of employees in the represented unit (Negroes
who must unequally with the white employees seek
job referrals through Local 1368) on the irrelevant,
invidious and unfair basis of race and that these labor
organizations
have thereby violated... Sec. 8(b)(1) (A)
'2113
of the Act.
The no-doubling arrangement and the ILA's reprisals
against the Negro charging parties, conducted under the
Hughes Tool Co., Trial Examiner's Intermediate Report 15.
21 Racial segregation is the rule within the South Atlantic and Gulf

Coast District of the ILA. Although there are no ILA or District constitutional provisions compelling it, all locals within the District from Lake
Charles, Louisiana, to Brownsville, Texas, are so administered. Negro
Longshoremen comprise 75-80% of the membership of these locals.
28 Local 1367, Trial Examiner's Decision 10.
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guise of a trusteeship, were likewise found violative of the
section. Instead of recommending that the parties adopt a
fifty to fifty percent quota system for sharing the work,
as requested by the complaining Negro local, the trial
examiner left them to their own devices for formulating a
non-discriminatory hiring method in accordance with the
requirements of the NLRA.
Elevating the tactics of the N.A.A.C.P. and the General
Counsel in Hughes Tool Co. into a rule of administrative
practice, a regional director refused to issue an 8(b) (1)
complaint against Steelworkers Local 2401 (of Atlantic
Steel Company, Atlanta), on the ground that "the evidence fails to show that Respondent has, within six months

prior to the filing of the charge herein, failed to entertain

or process any grievance presented to it or that it has inter-

preted any claim adversely to the complainant .. "24 The
General Counsel, however, accepted the charging party's
theory of continuing prima facie violations in the local's
negotiation and acquiescence in segregated promotion and

seniority lines.2 15 Although the initial proceedings in this
cause proved abortive,2 16 the ultimate result will be of
crucial importance in the development of fair representation theory and sanctions. In effect, the N.A.A.C.P. has
mounted a collateral attack on Whitfield v. United Steel-

workers217 by alleging that a union's failure to act (even
without the presentation of grievances, as in Hughes Tool
1
Co.) constitutes the basis for an unfair labor practice."
-452 L.R.R. 247 (1963).
21 Ibid.

216The testimony on Negro complainants at the hearing
apparently bore
little similarity to the potent charges of discrimination in the affidavits submitted. The N.A.A.C.-P. ascribes this disparity between promise and performance to the traditional intimidation of Negroes on Southern witness
stands, regardless of forum, and intends to press its complaint with other
grievants. Interview with Herbert Hill, Labor Secretary, N.A.A.C.P.,
April 11, 1963.
21263 F. 2d 546 (5th Cir. 1959), cert. denied, 360 U.S. 902 (1959), discussed at notes 111-17, supra.
"I That the General Counsel is now solidly behind this offensive can
hardly be doubted after his recent issuance of an 8(b) (1) complaint
against Local 12, United Rubber Workers at the Goodyear Tire & Rubber
Company, 'Gadsden, Alabama, 52 L.R.R. 247 (1963). The discrimination
charged lies both in the union's refusal to process job transfer grievances
of Negro workers and in its failure to protest segregated working conditions. Indeed, Mr. Herbert Hill and General Counsel Rothman have
actually held periodic strategy conferences since the N.A.A.C.P. attacks
began. Interview with Herbert Hill, April 11, 1963. "It is the intention
of the Office of the General Counsel to give solid support to efforts to
provide equal representation where the rights invoked are intended to be
protected under industrial relations principles defined in the NLRA. Where
they are not properly subsumed under the remedial provisions of this
statute, of course, our hands will be tied." Office of the General Counsel,
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In his civil rights message to Congress on March 1, 1963,
President Kennedy said he had directed the Justice Department to "participate" in NLRB cases involving charges of
local union racial discrimination. He told the Department
"to urge the Board to take appropriate action against racial
discrimination in unions, so that administrative action...
will make unnecessary" 219 the enactment of new legislation. General Counsel Rothman welcomed the participation of the Justice Department, and announced his intention - already apparent - to secure rulings that racial
discrimination in the negotiation, execution, maintenance
or enforcement of a contract runs afoul of the unfair labor
practice provisions of the NLRA.22 0
B. Refusal to Aid Discriminatory Unions in Becoming
or Remaining Exclusive Bargaining Agents
1. Rescission of Certification
Only the first word of a journal of positive accomplishments in the area of recognition sanctions has been written
by the Board. When a union refused "to process and present
grievances of all members of the bargaining unit on a nondiscriminatory basis,""' the Board indicated that rescission
would be "appropriate", but refrained from so acting because it regarded the matter as one of first impression and
because a joint holder of the certification 222 had not been
guilty of any misconduct. When a union compelled Negro
workers to continue membership in a separate Negro local
that was uncertified and not a party to the collective agreement, rescission was not ordered because the objectionable
contract had expired and the offending union voluntarily
relinquished its certification and requested a new election. 3
No matter how unfavorable proof of past discrimination
has been, the Board has to date exercised lenient restraint,
admonishing unions to take advantage of opportunities to
correct their conduct.
In fact, the Board has never rescinded a single union's
certification because of racial discrimination, although for
twenty years it has reiterated, in various forms:
"We entertain grave doubt whether a union which
discriminatorily denies membership to employees on
NT\LRB, 1962 Calendar Year Report, 8 RlAcE REL. L. REP. 313 (1963). Editors
note: Mr. Rothman's term has expired and the new General Counsel is
Arnold Ordman.
n952 L.R.R. 289 (1963).
2wIbid.

2 Hughes Tool Co., 104 NLRB 318, 319 (1953).
2I.e., the segregated Negro Local 2.
2nLarus & Brother Co., 62 NLRB 1075 (1945).
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the basis of race may nevertheless bargain as the exclusive representative in an appropriate unit composed
in part of members of the excluded race. Such bargaining might have consequences at variance with the
purposes of the Act ....
"In the absence of proof that the union discriminatorily denies membership to employees in the appropriate unit because of their race, we see no reason to
dismiss its petition. However, if it is later shown, by
appropriate motion, that the union has denied equal
representation to any such employee because of his
race . . . we will consider rescinding any certification
which may be issued herein. ' '225
There are recent indications, however, that the Board may
soon attempt to give substance rather than lip service to
the Steele doctrine. In Pioneer Bus Co.,226 where the bargaining representative executed contracts which discriminated on racial lines, the Board again stated that such
action warranted revocation. But no motion for rescission
had been filed, for that remedy was unnecessary under the
Board's holding that a discriminatory contract establishing separate racial seniority lines may not bar a petition
for an election. It should be pointed out that this decision
was not based upon the fair representation doctrine, but
rather on the constitutional ground first rationalized in
Shelley v. Kraemer.227 This reasoning could very well lead
to a declaration that such separate seniority lines are illegal
in all the industries under the jurisdiction of the NLRB,
and may indicate that the Board prefers a constitutional
framework for its decision on rescission cases now pending.
At any rate, under the holding of Whitfield v. United
Steelworkers,2 8 if a union makes a contract allowing
transfer from one line of promotion to the other, with loss
of seniority for those transferring, this "solution" is considered an adequate correction of the illegality of separate
lines of promotion. In effect, the leading judicial decision
on this problem has already narrowed the implications of
the Board's decision in Pioneer Bus Co.
'21Bethlehem-Alameda Shipyard, 53 NLRB 999, 1016-17 (1943); accord,
Atlanta Oak Flooring Co., 62 NLRB 973 (1945).
= Carter Mfg. Co., 59 NLRB 804, 806 (1944) ; accord, Andrews Indus.,
Inc., 105 NLRB 946 (1953); General Motors Corp., 62 NLRB 427 (1945);
Southwestern Portland Cement Co., 61 NLRB 1217 (1945) ; and Virginia
Smelting Co., 60 NLRB 616 (1945).
140 NLRB 54, 51 L.R.R.M. 1546 (1962).

334 U.S. 1 (1948).

=8263 F. 2d 546 (5th Cir. 1959), cert. denied, 360 U.S. 902 (1959).
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In Hughes Tool Co.,229 the trial examiner rested his
rescission order on the Pioneer Bus Co. rule and the inadequacy of usual remedies for unfair labor practices.
Acknowledging the reforms effectuated by Local 1 since
the filing of the motion to rescind, he found rescission
nevertheless essential in the light of the long history of
racial discrimination at the Hughes plant. The trial examiner further recommended that in any future representation proceeding involving the plant,23 it should be made
"inexorably clear to all participants that the Board will
not tolerate racially discriminatory practices on the part
of any union which it certifies." ' '
This admonition
would be consistent with the Board's characterization of
rescission, in earlier Hughes Tool Co. litigation, as "an
anticipatory curb on a variety of actions not compatible
with the status of certified bargaining representatives."23' 2
2. Refusal of Certification
When actions "not compatible with the status of certified
bargaining representatives" can be anticipated before certification, application of the curb would seem to be equally
appropriate. Professor Sovern has suggested that
"a union's refusal to admit Negroes is highly probative
evidence that it will be unwilling or unable to represent them fairly .... Indeed, even in the absence of a
conflict of interest, the union leadership has much less
incentive to bestir itself in behalf of those excluded
from membership. Consequently, once a union has
been shown to exclude Negroes from membership, fair
representation seems so improbable that the union
should have the burden of adducing evidence that it
will represent Negroes in the bargaining unit fairly.
If the union fails to produce such evidence, the Board
should conclude that it2 -probably
will violate the duty
33
of fair representation.
- 52 L.R.R. 247 (1963).
During the period of the petitioning Steelworkers' incumbency at the
Hughes Tool plant, that union also maintained segregated locals, and entered into contracts providing for separate lines of progression and seniority.
152 L.R.R. 247, 248, Trial Examiner's Intermediate Report 19.
104 NLRB 318, 322 (1953). With regard to the practical efficacy of this
remedy, the present General Counsel of the N.A.A.C.P. Legal Defense
Fund once said that it is a "technique of dubious worth against discrimination." GREENBERG, RACE RErATIONS AND AMERICAN LAW 182 (1959).
Whether or not he has changed his position, the current legal offensive
within the administrative machinery of the NLRA is being conducted by
the General Counsel of the N.A.A.C.P. itself, a separate legal entity which
derives less of its operating income from the c ontributions of labor
organizations.
-3 Sovern, supra note 173, at 600.
2
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The NLRB has consistently refused to deny certification even where it has appeared most probable that the
winning union would violate its duty. The Board has not
been moved by allegations of past discriminatory representation, offered to support the probability of future unfairness,23 4 nor by allegations of discriminatory denials of
membership. 5 On the other hand, the Board has persistently refused to recognize a petition for representation
where the petition proposes, either explicitly or implicitly,
to exclude Negroes from the bargaining unit on the basis
of race.236 It should then follow that the Board will decline
to entertain a petition from a union that will ultimately

create an all-white unit by failing to represent Negroes in
the unit delineated by the Board." 7 Whether the NLRB
will accept this view - assuming it agrees with the
N.A.A.C.P. and its General Counsel in the rescission cases

-

remains to be seen. Its rejection will continue to rob the
duty of fair representation of much of its potential for
preventive action.
3. Refusal of Orders to Bargain

Rescission or refusal of discriminatory unions' certification will be sanctions of minimal importance unless the

Board also refuses to compel employers to bargain with
such unions.2 3 The Board has already stated it will not
compel an employer to bargain about obviously discrimina-

tory demands.2 39 And if, as may be predicted from Hughes
2 Coleman Co., 101 NLRB 120 (1952).
2See,
e.g., Pacific Maritime Assoc., 112 NLRB 1280 (1955), Stickless
Corp., 110 NLRB 2202 (1954), Texas & Pacific Motor Transp. Co., 77
NLRB 87 (1948).
Larus & Brother Co., 62 NLRB 1075, 1081 (1945).
Compare Summers, The Right to Join a Union, 47 CoL. L. REV. 33, 65
(1947), with Slovern, supra note 176, at 600-01. 'Professor Aaron has suggested that the NLRA be amended to forbid the recognition or certification
as exclusive bargaining representative of any union that discriminates in
the admission or representation of minority groups. That is the only
practical way . . . in which unions can be compelled to conform to the
national labor policy and to the constitution of the AFL-CIO. Letter to the
Editor, New Leader 30 (May 2, 1960).
mIn many situations, a local's very existence is posited on its certification as bargaining representative. But a union may legally be recognized
as bargaining representative without a certification if it represents a
majority of the employees. Cf. International Ladies Garment Workers v.
NLRB, 366 U.S. 731 (1961). See 29 U.S.C. § 158(b) (4) (B), (C), and (D) ;
29 U.S.C. § 159(c) (3) ; 29 U.S.C. § 159(e) (2) (1958) ; Brooks v. NLRB,
348 U.S. 96 (1954); NLRB v. Porter County Co-op, 314 F. 2d 133 (7th
Cir. 1963).
NLRB v. Blorg-Warner Corp., 356 U.S. 342 (1958) ; Medo Photo Supply
Corp. v. NLRB, 321 U.S. 678 (1944). Otherwise, the NLRB would be in
the absurd posture of compelling employers to engage in negotiations the
purpose of which is to violate the Act.
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Tool Co., the Board will begin to draw inferences in certification cases from a union's all-white membership rolls, it
can hardly be expected to respond differently in refusal-tobargain cases. Professor Sovern extends this reasoning to
its practical limits:
"The rule should be that an employer is free to
refuse to bargain altogether with a union that has
pressed a discriminatory demand, even if the pressure
falls short of refusing to conclude an agreement without the discriminatory provision. The union's demand
is ample evidence of its propensity for ignoring the
duty of fair representation. Under the circumstances
it must be reckoned likely to transgress again during
its tenure as exclusive representative .. "240
Even if the NLRB adopted this principle, however, unions
with strong, well-established bargaining relationships and
unions in a position to strike recalcitrant employers would
not be seriously hindered in the attainment of their racially
invidious aims. But given the choice between abandoning
segregationist policies and risking their bargaining-agent
status in recognition strikes, most unions will choose to
cease discriminating - particularly when concurrent pressure is being exerted by their international parent.24 '
III.

CONCLUSION

Nothing short of a strong national fair employment
practices law will provide adequate relief for the ubiquitous
racial discrimination long practiced by American unions
and employers. At least until such a program becomes
probable, however, the existing restraint of the doctrine
of fair representation should be utilized in the courts to the
fullest extent possible. Unfortunately, the availability of
judicial relief is limited by the financial resources of complainants, and the present posture of the N.A.A.C.P. Legal
Defense and Education Fund promises little assistance in
this vital "civil rights" area. Even if access to judicial
coercion were free, its effectiveness in changing union
racial practices would be restricted, as court actions require
great organization and time, are uncertain as to their outcome, and rarely produce compensatory damages for the
plaintiffs. Lawsuits are valuable to aggrieved minority
v- Sovern, supra note 176, at 605.
wThis is both the historical experience and the operating rationale of
the N.A.A.C.P. Interview with Herbert Hill, January 11, 1963.

1964]

"FAIR REPRESENTATION" DOCTRINE

163

groups, however, as threats to discriminating unions. Occasionally, injunctions have enabled Negroes to prevent
unions from causing them to lose their jobs.
Without explicit statutory prohibition of union membership discrimination, Negro workers must ultimately rely
on forces outside the labor movement to effect changes in
bargaining agents' conduct. The courts and the NLRB can
help in this respect, by recognizing that white unions
are not likely to represent Negroes fairly and that they
should - when their actions are challenged - bear the
burden of proving that they have given fair representation
to Negroes. But the key to practical implementation of
the principle of fair representation lies in the possibility of
prophylactic sanctions. The NLRB can accomplish much
that has been shown to be beyond the courts' capacities by
rescinding and withholding certification from and by refusing to order employers to bargain with unions likely to
default on their duty. The potential for enforcement of
the duty through unfair labor practice proceedings is in
the initial stages of realization. As long as Congress is in
default with regard to effective FEPC legislation, one of its
existing enactments, the NLRA, should be widely exploited. If and when Congress does establish machinery
for attacking racially unfair employment practices, the
Board should remain in the field as an alternative forum
for selective local offensives.
Unions are unlikely to promote the interests of Negroes
except where the abolition of racial discrimination is
elevated to the level of their other political and economic
objectives. The AFL-CIO and the national unions do not
favor discrimination, but they will have little power to
change the practices of local unions until public pressures
raise the priority of anti-discrimination policies by tarnishing their public moral image. The real problems of employment discrimination will probably remain at the local
level, and whether or not locals will take remedial action
depends upon the extent to which they may be compelled
to do so by parent internationals or by external agencies.
AFL-CIO President George Meany has requested federal
fair employment practices legislation which would establish a framework within which the labor movement might
vigorously enforce its own verbally equalitarian policies.
But even with such a framework, implementation of the
Steele doctrine will require concerted effort - and, perhaps, bitter conflict - by aggrieved individuals, pressure
groups, fact-finding organizations, employers and the power
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echelons of the union bureaucracies, all using weapons appropriate to the local union whose policies are under attack.
*

*

*

*

*

*

EDITOR'S NOTE
The publication of this article follows on the heels of the
National Labor Relations Board's heralded decision in the
Metal Workers Union' (Hughes Tool Co.) case. The Board,
adopting for the most part the trial examiner's decision,
declared that the union's breach of its fair representation
duty resulted in a violation of Sections 8(b) (1) (A),
8 (b) (2) and 8 (b) (3) of the National Labor Relations
Act, and proclaiming that a finding of such racial discrimination on the part of a union warranted a refusal or rescission of the union's certification, ordered, for the first time,
the certification rescinded. With the use of sweeping language, the Board stated that, "(A) labor organization cannot, when acting as exclusive bargaining representative,
lawfully exclude, segregate, or otherwise discriminate'2
among members of a bargaining unit on racial grounds.
Affirming the trial examiner's findings, the Board held,
first, that when Local 1 (white) declined to process the
grievance of a Negro union member of Local 2 whose application for an apprenticeship was ignored, it "refused to
represent him, and hence it has restrained or coerced him
in his exercise of his right to be represented"' in violation
of Section 8(b) (1) (A). Second, the refusal to process the
grievance amounted to an 8(b) (3) violation, in that the
processing of grievances is part of the bargaining function
and, a fortiori, a refusal to process the grievance is a refusal
to bargain. Third, the withholding from the applicant of
treatment which would have been given him had he been
eligible for membership in Local 1 established a violation
of 8(b) (2) in that the union, "for arbitrary or irrelevant
reasons or upon the basis of an unfair classification ...
[attempted] to cause or does cause an employer to derogate
the employment status of an employee, and that union
membership is encouraged or discouraged whenever a union
causes an employer to affect an individual's employment
status."'4 Then the Board, after stating "that the Board
12 Lab. Rel. Rep. (56 L.R.R.M.) 1289 (1964).
22 Lab. Rel. Rep. (56 L.R.R.M.) at 1291.

8Ibid.
'2 Lab. Rel. Rep. (56 LR.R.M.) at 1292.
N.L.R.B. No. 7, 51 L.R.R.M. 1584, 1587 (1962).

See Miranda Fuel Co., 140
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cannot validly render aid under Section 9 of the Act to a
labor organization which discriminates racially when acting
as a statutory bargaining representative" 5 ordered the
union's certification rescinded.
A minority of the Board argued that there was no legislative authority for basing an unfair labor practice upon a
violation of the duty of fair representation. Despite the
minority's reasoning and the Second Circuit Court of
Appeals' reversal of the Board in Miranda,6 it is believed
that the majority opinion will prove persuasive when
Hughes reaches the courts.
*2 Lab. Rel. Rep. (56 L.R.R.M.) at 1294.
0
N.L.R.B. v. Miranda Fuel Co., Inc., 326 F. 2d 172, 54 L.R.R.M. 2715
(2d Cir. 1963).

